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PRIVACY AND RECORD KEEPING: REMEDIES FOR
ThE MISUSE OF ACCURATE INFORMATION
PETER N. SWANt
Modem societies are indisputably information-intensive. This is
an understandable consequence of telecommunication networks that
span continents and oceans, commercial practices that rely heavily on
credit, welfare economics that impact upon millions, research facilities,
and industrial processes that create and require huge quantities of data.
The ability to process and communicate information permits tremen-
dous efficiencies and technological progress, but it also creates vulnera-
bilities and opportunities for abuse.
Tort law has evolved a sizable jurisprudence for handling untrue
utterances and publications that are damaging to reputation. The
remedies for invasion of privacy fostered by Warren and Brandeis have
dealt in limited measure with accurate but harmful disclosures.' Yet
American law has never developed a coherent body of law to handle all
forms of unauthorized use of accurate information. Indeed, a sizable
part of the problem is the very determination of what is "authorized"
and what is not.
This article will examine the various tort principles through which
information misuse claims can be analyzed and resolved. It will dem-
onstrate that non-tort law approaches, especially statutory remedies, are
often possible. Tort law will be examined for incompleteness and for
areas of potential expansion. An effort is made to gauge its effective-
ness to cope with present-day problems and to assess the wisdom of its
bounds and limits. Existing legislative solutions are discussed. A
proposed model statute covering the specific problem of maintaining
criminal justice data is developed and defended. The rogues gallery of
villains in this piece includes indifferent custodians, spiteful detectives,
greedy competitors, and criminals. The victims range from borrowers
of money and seekers of licenses through ex-convicts and mental pa-
tients.
t Professor of Law, The University of Oregon School of Law.
1. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rlv. 193 (1890).
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COMMON LAW TORT THEORIES
Tort theories for misuse of information include intentional behav-
ior, negligence and, arguably, strict liability.2 Persons may misuse data
through motives of profit or spite, or they may simply be indifferent to
the consequences to the data subject. Thus, defendants may be data
custodians, data users, chance recipients, or persons who discover, ex-
tract, or revive basic facts.
The numerous cases finding liability against harassing creditors
represent one variety of an intentional tort theory of recovery. The
earlier cases were the precursors of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress.' Other cases involving bill collectors, in which
repetitiveness or vindictiveness were not so evident, were arguably decid-
ed under theories of invasion of privacy by publicity. 4 In the former
cases, the use of the information itself was ancillary to the behavior and
2. Strict liability has been utilized in defamation cases when the defendant neither
knew of the plaintiff nor intended to defame him. See Smith, Jones v. Hulton: Three
Conflicting Judicial Views as to a Question of Defamation, 60 U. PA. L. REv. 365, 371
(1912). Similarly, liability for defamation was traditionally visited upon republishers
regardless of their lack of intent or fault. See, e.g., Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228
N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920) (book publisher). But see Balabanoff v. Fossani, 192
Misc. 615, 81 N.Y.S.2d 732 (Sup. CL 1948) (large newspaper vendor). See generally
Painter, Republication Problems in the Law of Defamation, 47 VA. L. REV. 1131 (1961).
It could be argued that even if accurate information pertaining to plaintiff which would
offend the sensibilities of the ordinary man is disseminated without fault or neglect, the
disseminator should be liable by analogy to the republication concept. This argument is
not likely to prevail: a truly accidental dissemination should not be actionable. Second-
ly, most disseminations are intentional, though there may well be difficulty in showing
they understood or knew to a "substantial certainty" that harm would ensue from the
disclosure. Thirdly, some situations may arise where the disclosure is, indeed, intention-
al, but is motivated by a reasonable, yet erroneous belief that disclosure is privileged. See
text accompanying notes 13-14 infra. On the other hand, some of the reasoning un-
derlying the recent erosion of republishers' liability, viz. that a more culpable and re-
sponsible defendant is available, is not necessarily appropriate to the accurate informa-
tion cases. In the latter, the author or collector of the data is often privileged. It is
the custodian or disseminator (the republisher) whose act of transmittal and publication
is the first (and perhaps the only) harmful and unprivileged act. This does not resolve
the ultimate question of who should bear the loss, but it does permit the analysis to focus
squarely on the disseminator.
The recent case of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) proscribed
strict liability in defamation actions and this proscription was recognized in a false-light
defamation case, Drotzmanns, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 500 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1974).
This may well preclude the application of strict liability principles to accurate informa-
tion cases since if untrue publications derive partial shelter from first amendment
concerns, presumably accurate publications would be at least as deserving of protection
from liability without fault.
3. See, e.g., Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954).
4. See, e.g., Trammell v. Citizens News Co., Inc., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708
(1941) (newspaper notice of amount owing); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W.
967 (1927) (signboard publicizing amount owing).
PRIVACY AND RECORD KEEPING
motives of the collector.5  In the latter cases, however, it was seemingly
the purpose to which the information was applied or the manner of its
employment that justified liability.
Another type of intentional tortfeasor is the person who commits or
threatens to commit extortion. Under most circumstances, this is a
criminal act punishable under criminal law. No appellate decisions can
be discovered in which the mere threat to disclose (whether or not
successful in getting the "hush money") has been held to be a tortious
misuse of information. If the blackmailer's bluff is called, however, and
he or she then discloses the information, this could constitute "misuse."
If the information is intimate and theretofore unknown, a disclosure to
the public generally, or at least to a substantial number of people, would
constitute an actionable invasion of privacy. If the information was not
personally embarrassing but was merely a fact that would be prejudicial
when disclosed, the privacy theory does not apply." Nevertheless, one is
left with a feeling that such a disclosure serving no societal function
should be redressable. Perhaps both the blackmailer who carries out
his threat and the spiteful person who discloses without a prior extortion
attempt should be reached under a prima facie tort theory.
7
The governmental agencies that have custody of the greatest
amount of potentially prejudicial accurate information are the law en-
forcement agencies. Leaving aside the negligibly small number of
instances in which vindictiveness may be involved, there are still be-
lieved to be a sizable number of instances in which information is leaked
through carelessness, misguided notions of public responsibility, or the
return of favors to private investigators or friends." These disclosures,
5. This is especially true when the data concerning the amount allegedly owing
was only communicated to the plaintiff or his agents or family. Excessive or repetitive
communication of the information to the alleged debtor's employer may also fit this
classification.
6. The requirement that the disclosure have concerned "intimate facts" has been
broadened somewhat and the test now is whether the disclosed information would have
offended a person of ordinary sensibilities had such information pertained to such a
person. See Samuel v. Curtis Publishing Co., 122 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Cal. 1954). The
broader test would probably encompass financial circumstances that were unique to the
individual, even though personal emotions, family relationships or physical behavior need
not have been involved.
7. Cf. Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909) (predatory competi-
tion with vindictive motive). For a criticism of the publicity variety of the invasion of
privacy tort see Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 326, 333-37 (1966).
8. In the author's experience, private investigators sometimes assure clients that
they have "reliable inside sources" in government agencies that can expeditiously provide
recorded data to the investigator. At a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee of
the Oregon Legislature in 1973 (H.B. 2470), a former police department employee tes-
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both negligent and intentional, might often be redressable under an
invasion of privacy theory if widespread publicity is given the leaked
data. If the material is released only to a particular person in a position
to prejudice the file subject, the publicity-privacy theory becomes less
tenable, and the prima facie tort or statutory remedies must be utilized.0
Defenses
There are instances, however, when even a spiteful disclosure could
support societal purposes. The legally disinterested person who reduces
or eliminates the inheritance of a putative heir by revealing the where-
abouts of the missing true heir is, regardless of motive, helping the law
achieve the purpose of predictable and fair succession of wealth. Simi-
larly, the person who comes forth with compromising facts about a
political figure, though acting from base motives, may nevertheless
further society's interest in having the most able and least vulnerable
persons attain or hold office. If the analysis proceeds upon the theory
of a qualified privilege, malicious motives should destroy the privilege
even in such cases. But the qualified privilege notion derives principal-
ly from the law of defamation. There, the maliciousness is arguably
interrelated with the knowing promulgation of an untruth. In other
words, it may be that the courts have focused on scienter instead of on
just the motive for disclosure. 10  If motive is the sole desideratum in the
qualified privilege cases, the notion could be transplanted to the accur-
ate information cases, but this would seem counterproductive."
To the extent such intentional disclosures are actionable, redress
should lie against the persons paid or bribed to divulge or make accessi-
ble the information within their control as well as against the person
desiring disclosure. Thus the bank officer or records clerk through
tified that he witnessed a fellow officer, as a favor to a friend who managed a motel,
repeatedly check the wanted persons, stolen car, and criminal record files concerning
certain motel customers.
9. Perhaps false-light theories of defamation could also be employed. Publicity-
type invasions of privacy have generally required some public or relatively widespread
disclosure. See Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir.
1962). But see Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920) (per
curiam) (no liability since disclosure privileged); Miller, Personal Privacy in the
Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in an Information-Oriented
Society, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 1091, 1157-58 (1969). For statutory remedies see text
accompanying notes 57-83 infra.
10. See Iverson v. Frandsen, 237 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1956); Stationers Corp. v.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 62 Cal. 2d 412, 398 P.2d 785, 42 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1965).
11. Cf. Craig v. Wright, 182 Okla. 68, 76 P.2d 248 (1938) (alleged defamatory
statement found to be true); W. PRossER, LAW oF ToRTs 794-96 (4th ed. 1971).
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whom the spiteful actor gains the damaging information should be liable
if he or she knowingly breached a confidence or violated a statutory
restraint. Private investigators, journalists, researchers and others who
collect, collate and analyze raw or incomplete data should not be liable
so long as they had no initial control or custody of the information and
disclosed it to no one except their client or employer. 12
When the information is contained in or derivable from the records
of a federal or state agency, the Freedom of Information Act or its state
counterpart, will be relevant as a defense for the disclosing custodian.
Here the scope of the exception for confidential material will likely be
the determinative issue. If a subjective test is used, focusing upon the
attitude of the subject toward the information supplied to the agency,
more data will be within the exemption. On the other hand, an objec-
tive test would eliminate more data from the exemption. 13 Problems
arise when the information is already disclosed as a result of an agency
employee's disregard or misconstruction of the exemption provision.
Since it is too late to enjoin disclosure, the question becomes whether
damages be recovered from the agency or, from the individual employ-
ee. The disclosure would be deliberate (since that was a part of the
employee's job) but not necessarily "intentional" in the sense of an
intentional tort.14 Assuming the misconstruction of the exemption was
negligent, the question of immunity arises. If the employee were not a
high-level policymaker, the absolute immunity of Barr v. Matteo5
12. This is so even though the investigator's name and the identity of his sources
(if human) would have to be disclosed. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)
(5-4 decision). In Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
947 (1969), the court held the intrusionary methods of those who acquired Senator
Dodd's papers for clandestine copying and return would not make columnist Drew
Pearson liable for an intrusionary invasion of privacy. This was so even though the
defendant knew how the copies of the documents had 'been obtained when they were
presented to him. Defendant was held not liable on an independent count concerning a
publicity-type invasion of privacy as his publication was privileged. Id. at 703-06.
13. See, e.g., Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974). See
also National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Annot., 21 A.L.R. Fed. 224 (1974).
14. Of course, one can imagine a situation where a public employee disclosed the
information pursuant to a request under the Freedom of Information Act knowing that
one of the exemptions applied and knowing, or at least suspecting, that the plaintiff
would be injured by its release. This would be an intentional violation of the Act.
For an instance where statutory bases for exemption from disclosure under the Act
have been enumerated in detail see 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (7) (Supp. 1976) ("investiga-
tory records compiled for law enforcement purposes"). See generally Ellsworth,
Amended Exemption 7 of the Freedom of Information Act, 25 Am. U.L REV. 37
(1975).
15. 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (absolute privilege in libel action for acting director of
federal Office of Rent Stabilization).
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should not be available. The availability of qualified immunity to the
employee will usually depend upon statute. 6 The further question
exists whether there was a waiver of sovereign immunity were the
agency itself joined as a defendant. Waiver statutes frequently exclude
liability for defamation and for intentional torts.' 7  Assuming the infor-
mation disclosed is true, it cannot be said that plaintiff is suing in
defamation; yet one suspects the legislature was attempting to exclude
informational torts generally, and a hasty amendment might be expected
if courts found a lack of immunity. Protectors of trade secrets and
personal privacy might well suggest that this is an area in which the
government should be open to liability since the possibilities for abusing
its custodianship of coercively collected accurate information are mani-
fest.'8
CREDIT BUREAUS, MEDICAL RECORDS, AND CUSTODIANS
The nongovernmental entities that have custody over large
amounts of potentially damaging data are credit bureaus and investiga-
tive reporting agencies. The bureaus, whether commercial' or cooper-
16. See, e.g., Elder v. Anderson, 205 Cal. App. 2d 326, 23 Cal. Rptr. 48 (5th Dist.
1962); cf. Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (civil rights case), rev'd
sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
17. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(h) (Supp. 1976) (libel). But see Quinones v.
United States, 492 F.2d 1269 (3d Cir. 1974) (claim for negligent maintenance of
personnel records prejudicial to former employee's job prospects not within exemption
for libel under Federal Tort Claims Act). See also Appendix § 14.
18. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Turner v. Reed, 538 P.2d 373
(Ore. App. 1975). In Turner, the court held "public records where the only interest in
confidentiality is to protect public officials from criticism of the manner in which they
have discharged their public duties [to be per se available for public inspectio]"
and added "[c]itizens are entitled to inspect public records to learn what their govern-
ment is doing-this means learning of government's possible shortcomings, not just
government's successes." Id. at 381. For a discussion of government agencies selling
data for commercial mailing lists, see Hey, How many chinks in your privacy wall?,
Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 5, 1970, at 11, col. 1. For a general discussion of
mailing lists, their economics and their potential abuses, see SECRETARY'S ADViSORY
COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, HEW, REcoRDs, COMPUTERS AND
THE RIoHTS OF CrzENs 288-97 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT].
19. The growth of commercial credit bureaus has been nothing short of dramatic.
Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc., an organization with around 1900 credit bureau mem-
bers, estimated its members maintained about 110 million files in 1969. Its credit
bureau members do not compile investigative reports. They do provide credit reports to
banks, retail merchants and finance companies. Retail Credit Company is the largest
investigative report preparer in the country (preparing nearly eighty-five percent of all
such reports). It is the corporate parent of Credit Bureau, Inc., which in turn does own
conventional credit bureaus. Thus there exist financial and directive interconnections
between the two functions but they are most often accomplished in separate physical
locations and with different personnel, employed by separate entities. Telephone inter-
view with Barry Connelly, Vice President of Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc., in Hous-
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atively owned,2" are both the collectors of the information and the
custodians of it once compiled. This presents some doctrinal problems.
First, the majority of the information gathered, e.g., tenure of employ-
ment and tax liens, is not per se confidential. Secondly, it could be
argued that having taken the effort to collect the information from
disparate sources and to compile it, the credit bureau may dispose of it
as if it had a proprietary interest. Thirdly, the disclosures of a credit
bureau have traditionally enjoyed a qualified privilege in defamation
law, and, by analogy, it could be argued that accurate disclosures to
members or clients with an asserted need to know should enjoy a similar
privilege.
21
The probability of inaccurate or distorted information being in-
cluded in the compilation has been documented,22 as has the danger of
dissemination to those not having even an attenuated need to know.23
Apart from the erroneous information problem is what could be called
the "saliency factor" or the "oracle syndrome." However reliable the
original source of information may have been, the heavy reliance on
automated data processing devices and the related high cost of data
storage lead inevitably to synopsizing, highlighting, collapsing, compact-
ing, and terseness. This frequently results in a qualitative deterioration
of the data in terms of cybernetic value. The potential for an unjustifia-
bly damaging impact is exacerbated by the tendency of laypersons to
hold the computer and its output in awe as infallible and omniscient.24
ton, Texas, Apr. 11, 1975.
For a brief description of the meteoric rise of TRW-Credit Data Corporation
(which is not an Associated Credit Bureaus member), see A. WESrIN & M. BAKER,
DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY 132-35 (1972).
20. See, e.g., London Ass'n for Protection of Trade v. Greenlands, Ltd., [1916] 2
A.C. 15.
21. See Bartels v. Retail Credit Co., 185 Neb. 304, 175 N.W.!2d 292 (1970)
(privilege lost by recklessness); Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 776 (1953); cf. Annot., 40
A.L.R.3d 1049 (1971). See also Kansas Elec. Supply Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 448
F.2d 647 (10th Cir. 1971) (no first amendment privilege for retail credit bureau).
22. A. MILLER, THm ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 84-87 (1971).
23. Id. at 87-88. But see A. WEsTIN & M. BAKER, supra note 19, at 255, 440
(suggesting that computerization per se has little to do with information sharing with
government agencies).
24. Alan Westin and Michael Baker have determined that overreliance on computer
print-outs is no more frequent or aggravated than overreliance on manually recorded
conclusions and summaries. A. WESIN & M. BAKER, supra note 19, at 259-64. Similar-
ly they contend that coding data for computer processing did not lead "to any greater
misuse of shorthand notations than was present in the manual era." Id. at 266. They
also believe that computerized systems, being susceptible of rapid updating, would show
an increase in accuracy. Id. at 300. The trend is definitely toward computerizing and
networking the files. See A. MILLER, supra note 22, at 90-93. For a good general
discussion of the sociological impact of computerized records see Comment, The Corn-
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Allowing such output to reach others to whom the original sources are
not available can be classified either as a material untruth by creating a
false light or as the misuse of accurate (so far as it goes) information.
The exact description might be regarded as nothing more than a seman-
tic problem were it not for the common law's reluctance to redress the
latter situation.
Moreover, even if the recipient of the credit report receives a valid
impression based on accurate computer input, damage to the file subject
could result.2 5 If the recipient has a real need to know,20 it can be
convincingly argued that society's needs in the capital, underwriting and
employment markets are superior to the individual's desire that the past
remain secret and are even superior to the need to rehabilitate criminals,
bankrupts and misanthropes. However, the dissemination can be overly
broad, especially when disclosed to persons or entities that do not have
an immediate potential of entering into significant economic or thera-
peutic relationships with the file subject. To suggest that no damage
would flow from such revelation since no economic consequences are
probable is to disregard the dignitary aspects of the action for invasion
puter Data Bank-Privacy Controversy Revisited: An Analysis and an Administrative
Proposal, 22 CATH. U.L. REv. 628, 636-42 (1973).
25. This assumes that the sources of the data input to the file were accurate ledgers
and records, fair-minded individuals with good perceptions and memories, and unequivo-
cal circumstantial evidence. Obviously such idealized prerequisites are seldom satisfied
and this difficulty is not unique to credit or investigative reporting. Nevertheless, it
should make one chary of making conclusive human decisions based solely on past
history.
In order not to compound the potential qualitative weaknesses of input, certain
minimum safeguards are required. As one study group suggested, record-keeping organi-
zations should adhere to the following fundamental principles:
'There must be no personal-data record-keeping systems whose very exist-
ence is secret.
*There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about
him is in a record and how it is used.
*There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about
him obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other
purposes without his consent.
'There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of
identifiable information about him.
*Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records
of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their
intended use and must take reasonable precautions to prevent misuse of the
data.
HEW REPORT, supra note 18, at 41.
26. The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1970), lists the following
as permissible recipients of consumer reports (which may include investigative materi-
al): persons reasonably believed to require the data for (a) entering into a credit
transaction involving the file subject; (b) employing the file subject; (c) underwriting
insurance involving the file subject; (d) conferring a governmental license as to which
the applicant's (file subject's) financial status is relevant as a matter of law; (e) entering
into a "business transaction" "involving" a file subject.
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of privacy. Emotional distress or the deprivation of the individuality
2 7
of the file subject is suffered merely by the awareness that such matters
are now known to third persons.28 In these overly wide dissemination
situations the invasion of privacy concept is slightly but not fatally
attenuated. The information has either been selectively disclosed by the
subject or is lying dormant in the public domain, needing only to be
identified with the subject and republished to have a fresh impact on the
subject.29 The selective disclosure is often in a context of economic
necessity; thus it does not strain the concept too far to suggest that the
data is as private as the subject can realistically make it. The public
domain issue is more difficult to resolve in favor of the data subject since
society has traditionally enjoyed access to accurate reportage of histori-
cal fact. Yet, the further in the past the event or transaction occurred,
the utility of allowing public dissemination becomes correspondingly
less. If the dissemination is to a limited number of persons as opposed
to the general public, the utility may be even less. 0
The next most common types of dossier or personal data compila-
tions are medical records. These compilations have some similarity to
credit records in that there are valid reasons for maintenance of the data
and for dissemination on a need to know basis. On the other hand,
there is perhaps a greater tradition of confidentiality in the medical
industry than in the credit industry. Even the type of treatment history
data that does not qualify as a communication from the patient to the
27. See Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 962 (1964).
28. In the areas of credit experience, prior employment and medical treatment, it is
apparent that the events described were never wholly intimate in the sense that they were
known only to the data subject. Nevertheless, the number of persons who knew was
limited and they obtained their knowledge through the necessities of the occurrence. The
data subject's steeling himself for such a limited disclosure in no way suggests comfort
with or adaptability to wider dissemination.
29. Cf. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 866 (1971) (criminal record); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91
(4th Dist. 1931) (earlier career as a madam).
30. Superficially, it could be argued that plaintiff's injury will also be commensur-
ately less. There are two difficulties with this position. If the harm is viewed as a
dignitary injury, there need be no necessary quantitative relationship to the number of
recipients. (Note the anomaly here: -for defamation where the law attempts to redress
reputational harm, disclosure to a single person is sufficient; for invasion of privacy
where dignitary, subjective victimization is arguably what is to be redressed, disclosure
to a substantial number of persons is often required.) Secondly, if the "wrong" few peo-
ple received the disclosure (i.e. those with power directly or indirectly to withhold bene-
fits to the subject) they could inflict more injury than thousands of disinterested or
"powerless" recipients. On the other hand, it is conceivable that such key people would
be most likely, if anyone could, to demonstrate a need to know.
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physician"' may be treated by the record custodian as unavailable to
third parties absent consent by the patient.
CRIMINAL JUSTICB DATA
Criminal records differ from credit records in that law enforcement
agencies rather than private companies generate and maintain them.
Here the need to know lines are hard to draw. Those individuals
immediately concerned with the apprehension of suspects, the prosecu-
tion and sentencing of criminal defendants, and the detention, parole,
probation and rehabilitation of prisoners obviously have such a need
with respect to many matters in the person's file. The need is less
obvious, however, when the data is shared with out-of-state law enforce-
ment agencies, with members of the agency who have a personal as
opposed to a functional interest, and with government officials acting in
a political capacity.
32
A substantive philosophical issue is whether mere constraints on
dissemination are sufficient or whether, additionally, there should be
internal constraints based on a genuine need to know. Law enforce-
ment professionals point out that intentional, internal violations are
extremely rare and need-to-know monitoring (as opposed to training
and inculcation of access standards) would be disproportionally expen-
sive and inefficient. They argue that if constraints are appropriate, it is
quite sufficient to place constraints on dissemination. These arguments
do not adequately deal with corrupt personnel or those who disseminate
data through unconventional (and thus unaudited) channels. Of
course, even internal access audit procedures can be circumvented by a
determined and skillful expert, but such procedures would at least draw
attention to most of those who achieve access without any plausible need
to know.
Potential employers present a special case with countervailing so-
cial policies at play. The goal of rehabilitation and the need to assimi-
31. Such communications are, in many jurisdictions, subject to an evidentiary
privilege. See, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. § 44.040(d) (1974) (applies to all information
acquired in attending a patient but for civil actions only). Where a statutory or
common law basis for the privilege does not exist, the doctor's professional ethics may
not be enough to justify refusal to divulge. See Quarles v. Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651,
389 S.W.2d 249 (1965). If the information is not sought in a litigation context, no
evidentiary privilege would apply.
32. Consider the situation of a governor who is commander in chief of the state
police but may wish to study a person's file for purely political reasons or for hybrid
reasons such as appointment to a government job in which discretion and honesty are
vitally important.
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late criminals who have fulfilled their sentence into mainstream society
are vitally dependent upon employment. It can certainly be argued that
having paid his debt to society the "ex-con" should be able to make a
fresh start free from suspicion and intolerance. Yet the rehabilitation
process is notably fallible, and some forms of employment may provide
too great a temptation to engage in recidivistic conduct. The interests
of the potential employer, other employees, and the public may require
that certain employment be available to ex-convicts only if the employer
is willing and fully informed.33
Another special case centers around efforts to induce more care by
drivers through more directly reflecting the costs of the injuries they
inflict in insurance rating categories. Here, convictions for drunk driv-
ing, reckless driving, manslaughter with a vehicle, and related offenses
should be transmitted to the driver's liability insurer.3 4 In jurisdictions
having automatic license suspension or revocation for chronic offenders,
this information should also be sent to the appropriate state licensing
authority.
When it is unclear that the criminal justice data is actually erro-
neous, but it can be shown that it was gathered or adduced without
minimum due process protection to the file subject, dissemination
should be prevented. This is not to say that such data may not be
generated or recorded in the first instance,35 but rather it should not be
33. See Appendix §§ 4(3)-(4). To the extent that parolees are seeking jobs, it
cannot even be accurately said that they have "paid" their debt to society: at best they
are still "paying." However this retributive attitude appears to be receding in favor of
the rehabilitative approach, so notions of a "balance owing" may well be inappropriate.
If, on the other hand, one's criminal past is not a job-related concern, perhaps
confidentiality statutes should expressly allow ex-convicts to answer negatively to ques-
tions about criminal records on job applications and should prohibit employment
discrimination based on discovery of a criminal past. In Tosh v. Buddies Supermarkets,
Inc., 482 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1973), the court condoned an employer's acquiring (from a
friend in the police department) copies of criminal records of troublesome union
organizers and posting them to be seen by other employees. The court reasoned this was
consistent with minimizing risks to store personnel.
34. Presumably, one or more convictions for violating the vehicle code (at least
provisions which pertain to safety) will eventually result in a less desirable rating
category for automobile insurance purposes. The theory assumes that past behavior is
indicative of future behavior and that the laws do indeed proscribe unsafe conduct. Given
these assumptions, the new rating will require higher premiums, thus partially internaliz-
ing the costs of the insured's statistically more injurious behavior. For a discussion of
premium cost allocation techniques not based on individual experience see Morris,
Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE
L.J. 554, 567-69 (1961).
35. Cf. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971) (publication of no-
sale drunk without prior hearing); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 126 (1951).
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disseminated beyond those needing to know for law enforcement pur-
poses. This would include "intelligence dat&' that is primarily subjec-
tive.or investigatory and deductive, and frequently contains or is based
on hearsay. If sufficient safeguards are not present with regard to
physical security, remote access, unaccounted for copies, loss of saliency,
and encryption of transmissions in computerized systems, many feel it is
best to keep intelligence material outside of the computerized system
altogether.
3 6
Finally, there is the extremely difficult problem of access to records
and intelligence reports for national security purposes. No completely
satisfactory solution to the tension between personal privacy and nation-
al security has emerged, but it is apparent that national security interests
usually prevail. If a serious national security risk is involved, federal
agents will most certainly conduct their own investigation if they are
denied access to existing records and reports of state agencies. Efficien-
cy in both time and taxpayer cost would dictate the elimination of such
redundancy. On the other hand, since the accuracy of investigative data
may be open to doubt, redundancy would improve reliability. Still
another possibility is that, faced with the necessity of an independent
investigation, federal agents will reappraise the risk and forego the
investigation itself, with the possible exception of prospective surveil-
ance.
If the records are criminal records in the custody of a state law
enforcement agency, the problem is essentially one of federalism3 7
36. E.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 749B.8 (Cum. Supp. 1976); S. 2963, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. § 208 (1974); see Appendix § 12. Some of Westin's research indicated (though
not unequivocally) that the majority of data systems in his sample kept narrative,
sensitive and subjective data off the computer and in manual files instead. A. WESTIN &
M. BAKER, supra note 19, at 424-27.
The use of information heard or recorded by means of telephone wire taps is beyond
the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that law enforcement and national security
wire taps are covered by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. H§ 2510-20 (1970). Civil redress for the person whose communication was
unlawfully intercepted, used or disclosed is provided against the tapper, user or discloser
for actual damages or liquidated damages ($100 for each day of violation or $1000)
whichever is greater. Id. § 2520.
For a general discussion of governmental wiretapping see Glasser & Schwartz, Your
Phone is a Party Line, HAMUERs, Nov. 1972, at 106. See also Simpson v. Simpson, 490
F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974) (spouse-instigated wiretap of own spouse, not prohibited by
Omnibus Crime Control Act).
37. Where an individual's personal expectations of privacy are involved, the fourth
amendment will offer protection agasint warrantless searches by federal agents concerned
with domestic security. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297
(1972) (domestic wiretap); Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590,
118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1975) (bank surrendered depositor's records to police). But when
intelligence gathering concerning foreign powers is involved, it appears that a warrant
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Absent a federal or a state statute, the state officials could either comply
with or refuse the federal agents' requests as they saw fit. If, in such a
situation, the federal agents obtained a subpoena duces tecum, the dis-
closure would have to be made. If there were a state statute forbidding
such disclosure, the state officials' refusal to obey the subpoena should
be sheltered. But a federal statute compelling such disclosure with or
without a warrant or subpoena would preempt the state law, and the
officials would have to comply.
s8
Keeping compilations from news reporters raises first amendment
questions. Of course, the press is not foreclosed from all access since
they can observe the daily police "blotter" 9 and judicial docket entries,
will not be required if the agents are acting within the scope of their delegated authority
from the President. See United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 881 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 425-56 (5th Cir. 1973).
However, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d
594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), held that a warrant was required to tap the telephones of mem-
bers of the Jewish Defense League which opposed the emerging United States-Russian
detente notwithstanding a presidential directive concerning foreign intelligence gathering
for the protection of national security. When the file subject does not suffer an invasion
of his own dwelling, car, or privacy envelope (e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967); North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 502 P.2d 1305, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833
(1972)), but rather suffers access to personal data in the hands of another, it is doubtful
that he can apply his constitutional right to the obtaining of information from the cus-
todian. Cf. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 52-53, 55 (1974) (fourth
and fifth amendments). This is so even though the custodian might have suffered a
deprivation of his own rights under the fourth amendment (e.g., Daniel Ellsburg's psy-
chiatrist).
38. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI; see Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364
(1907).
39. See Appendix § 4(5). The police blotter would reflect arrests made on that
day in that precinct. Thus the information derivable from the blotter would not be
cumulative. Compiling a record of any one individual's arrest history would therefore
require daily checks and an ad hoc compilation by the investigator (journalist). Al-
though this method is less efficient than present methods, verification of alleged
harassment (e.g., by unjustified, successive "rousts" or arrests) could still be accom-
plished. Moreover, the victim could subpoena his compilation for any proceeding before
a police review board or court so the records would not be suppressed in any formal
challenge to such harassment. See Appendix §§ 4(2) (a), 10(1)-(4). Of course, if a
group of law enforcement agents conspired to carry out oppressive tactics and protect
themselves, they would not make records in the first place; but this slight risk is present
with or without press access to individual criminal histories. Department of Justice
policy presently does not permit disclosure of prior convictions of a criminal defendant
or a civil party litigant or civil witness. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 50.2(b) (4), (c) (2) (1975).
The Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union is even against press
access to the daily police blotter. Hearings on H.R. 13315 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 27, at 167 (1972).
Even now, not all "public," i.e. governmental, records are subject to disclosure. In
Oregon, for example, if Corrections Division officials can persuade a court that the
public interest in confidentiality clearly outweights the public interest in disclosure,
prison and parole records need not be disclosed. On. REv. STAT. § 192.500(2) (d)
(1974). See Turner v. Reed, 538 P.2d 373 (Ore. App. 1975) (subjective advisory or
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attend trials, and access summary records pertaining to prison releasees
or escapees. Wanted and missing persons data can be publicly dissemi-
nated. There may be objections to making such data confidential
thereafter. One answer to this is that there is a substantial difference
between a single item of current newsworthiness and an entire compila-
tion that may go back twenty years or more. Another objection may be
that such restraints on access will cause newspapers, credit agencies, and
employment agencies to create their own data banks of unsupervised
reliability. This seems speculative at best since the collection process
would be expensive; on the other hand, title insurance companies do just
that with excellent efficiency and reliability.
The Supreme Court in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn40 has
spoken broadly on the subject of freedom of the press in the criminal
justice context. Cohn involved a television newscast report identify-
ing a rape-murder victim. A Georgia statute prohibited such disclo-
sures, and the father of the deceased brought an action for invasion of
his privacy. Because the newsman had obtained the information legal-
ly-by examining the indictment during the course of the trial-the
statute was attacked on first amendment grounds.41 The Court held the
statute invalid but expressly declined to "address the broader question
whether truthful publications may ever be subjected to civil or criminal
liability consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, or
. . . whether the State may impose sanctions on the accurate publica-
tion of the name of a rape victim obtained from. . . judicial records
. . . open to public inspection."4 2 Having carefully limited its holding,
the Court then added that ",It]he commission of crime, prosecutions
resulting from it and judicial proceedings arising from the prosecutions
. . . are without question events of legitimate concern for the public
and consequently fall within the responsibility of, the press to report the
operations of government."43  While this is undoubtedly true with re-
spect to current news and statistical studies of law enforcement, it does
not necessarily follow that all such material is forever protected. The
Court next said, however, in expansive dictum:
By placing the information in the public domain on official
court records, the State must be presumed to have concluded that
evaluative material shielded from disclosure but objective information generally not
shielded).
40. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
41. Id. at 474.
42. Id. at 491.
43. Id. at 492.
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the public interest was thereby being served. Public records by
their very nature are of interest to those concerned with the admin-
istration of government, and a public benefit is performed by the
reporting of the true contents of the records by -the media. The
freedom of the press to publish that information appears to us to
be of critical importance to our type of government in which the
citizenry is the final judge of -the proper conduct of public business.
In preserving that form of government the First and Fourteenth
Amendments command nothing less than that the States may not
impose sanctions for the publication of truthful information con-
tained in official court records open to public inspection.
44
This suggests that the Court believes "once public, always public."
Yet it would not seem inconsistent for a state to "conclude" that
criminal justice information should be public only in relevant segments
and at relevant times.45  Also, the state might take a different view of
balancing the continuing privacy interest of a live file subject as con-
trasted with the more attenuated "one-shot" interest of a parent of a
deceased court-record subject.
Those who argue against the purging of any arrest records often
stress the fact that the arrestee can actually reassure prospective employ-
ers by showing a no-conviction disposition. Besides the doubts about
how "reassuring" any arrest record, even one not resulting in a convic-
tion, might be,46 the fact remains that over one-third of the arrests
44. Id. at 495. Courts have generally shown a tendency to shield the media from
liability for disclosing matters which are colorably of public interest even on nonconstitu-
tional grounds. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940)
(adult life of recluse who had been a celebrated child prodigy); Meetze v. Associated
Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956) (birth by twelve-year-old mother).
45. See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Lopez, 216 Kan. 108, 531 P.2d 455 (1975)
(privately maintained arrest records subpoenable but use restricted to equal employment
hearing). See generally Appendix § 4(5).
46. For an excellent discussion of the impact of arrest records on job applicants'
opportunities for employment, see Comment, Discriminatory Hiring Practices Due To
Arrest Records-Private Remedies, 17 VILL. L. Rrv. 110 (1971). One survey reported
that seventy-five percent of the New York employment agencies in its sample would not
refer an applicant with an arrest record regardless of the disposition of his case. Id. at
127 n.144; cf. Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), modified
on other grounds, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972) (job application forms which asked
about the applicant's arrest records held to violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., since blacks were proportionately more likely to have been
arrested). See also Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 741-43 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Note, Rehabilitation, Privacy and Freedom of the Press-Striking a New
Balance, 5 LOYOLA, (L.A.) L. REv. 544, 563-67 (1972). One Federal Bureau of
Investigation report indicates that only four percent of those arrested are held for
prosecution. See Comment, 17 ViLL. L. Ray., supra, at 110 n.2. For a discussion of
cases holding that an acquittal or a successful action for false imprisonment negates any
subsequent prejudice from an arrest record, see Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 900, 904 (1972).
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reported to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) are never
followed by reports of disposition.4 7
Another more fundamental problem involves the retention of arrest
records that have no disposition or show an acquittal. On the one hand
is the argument that, justifiably or not, the person was arrested and
historical facts should not be purged or erased; one cannot "unring the
bell. '48 Police retention of such data is supported on the grounds that
legal "technicalities" not reflective of the defendant's innocence of the
charged violation have led to the decision not to prosecute or to an
acquittal. There is also a reliance on statistical probability of guilt that
is often based on a logical fallacyA9 The erasure of such records can be
supported on a variety of grounds ranging from common law privacy
theories5" to constitutional liberties."' Even when circumstances might
47. See PREsiENT's COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT & THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JusTicE, TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 76 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as TASK FORCE REPORT].
48. This anomaly leads to a related problem concerning job applications. If
the statutory expunction model is followed, see, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. § 137.225(1)
(1974), the subject of the record need not answer affirmatively to any question about
such a no-disposition arrest. If the purging statute does not cover such a situation
and the job applicant decides not to mention it, would a subsequent discharge caused
by the employer's learning of the nondisclosure be justifiable? Similarly, if the
arrestee were to bring a defamation action against a person who disclosed his arrest,
should "truth" be a defense and, if so, how could it be proven?
49. See Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
The syllogism that a person who commits one criminal act is more likely than a
previously law-abiding person to commit further crimes is no stronger than its minor
premise-if the initial arrest was of an innocent person, the reasoning becomes falla-
cious. "The mere fact that a man has been arrested has very little, if any, probative
value in showing that he has engaged in any misconduct. An arrest shows nothing more
than that someone probably suspected the person apprehended of an offense. When
formal charges are not filed . . . whatever probative force the arrest may have had is
normally dissipated." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957)
(footnote omitted).
50. In Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1972), plaintiff was
acquitted and successfully sought return from the police of the arrest records, finger-
prints and photographs. The court said:
Where the only reason for the presence of an individual's fingerprints and
photographs in the police file is based upon an arrest which has subsequently
been voided by an acquittal and no further justification is made for the reten-
tion of these fingerprints and photographs, no rational basis for their retention
remains.
We have now reached the point where our experience with the re-
quirements of a free society demands the existence of a nght of privacy in the
fingerprints and photographs of an accused who has been acquitted, to be at
least placed in the balance, against the claim of the state for a need for their
retention.
We believe the right of an individual, absent a compelling showing of nec-
essity by the government, to the return of his fingerprints and photographs,
upon an acquittal, is a fundamental right implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty and that it is as well within the penumbras of the specific guarantees of
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justify retention of such data52 there seem to be no persuasive reasons to
allow its dissemination to other than law enforcement agencies.
the Bill of Rights "formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484, 85 S.
Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1965).
Id. at 217.
51. In Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970), plaintiff sued to compel
the removal of his fingerprints from FBI files. He alleged he had been arrested without
probable cause, detained for two days and then released when California police were
satisfied that no basis existed for charging him with a crime. The court, in the course of
this opinion, made the following remarks:
Information denominated a record of arrest, if it becomes known, may
subject an individual to serious difficulties. Even if no direct economic loss
is involved, the injury to an individual's reputation may be substantial. Eco-
nomic losses themselves may be both direct and serious. Opportunities for
schooling, employment, or professional licenses may be restricted or nonexist-
ent as a consequence of the mere fact of an arrest, even if followed by acquit-
tal or complete exoneration of the charges involved. An arrest record may be
used by the police in determining whether subsequently to arrest the individual
concerned, or whether to exercise their discretion to bring formal charges
against an individual already arrested. Arrest records have been used in decid-
ing whether to allow a defendant to present his story without impeachment by
prior convictions, and as a basis for denying release prior to trial or an appeal;
or they may be considered by a judge in determining the sentence to be given
a convicted offender.
Id. at 490-91 (footnote omitted). The court further stated:
Many individuals have unjustly acquired arrest records without even the
excuse of an honest and unavoidable mistake by the police. In the District
of Columbia alone, literally thousands of persons were once arrested "for in-
vestigation" and then released; but their records often remain. Dragnet arrests
are at best matters of recent memory. Even worse are those occasions, far
more common than we would like to think, where invocation of the criminal
process is used ...often with no hope of ultimate conviction---as punitive
sanction. Hippies and civil rights workers have been harrassed and literally
driven from their homes by repeated and unlawful arrests, often made under
sanction. Hippies and civil rights workers have been harassed and literally
in mass arrests made to clear the streets either during a riot or during lawful
political demonstrations. Use of the power to arrest in order to inflict sum-
mary punishment is, of course, unconstitutional; but even if the arrest was
made lawfully and with the best of intentions, if the person arrested has been
exonerated it is difficult to see why he should be subject to continuing punish-
ment by adverse use of his "criminal" record.
Id. at 493-94 (footnote omitted).
In Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court held that the FBI
Records Division must expunge criminal records if the reporting law enforcement agency
advises that they are inaccurate. Similarly, it said that records must be expunged if the
FBI has reason to know there was no probable cause for the arrest or that the arrest was
unconstitutional. But see Voelker v. Tyndall, 226 Ind. 43, 75 N.E.2d 548 (1947). See
also Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211 (W.D. Mich. 1971) (acquittal); Hughes v.
Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (illegal mass arrest).
52. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.12(b) (1974) (FBI will not furnish arrest data more than
one year old without indication of disposition); Appendix § 8(6). Oregon's abortive
new legislation (see note 140 infra) had a provision for sealing records, but the file
subject was required to convince the court that his or her "interest in privacy and
reputation outweighs the public interest in maintenance of the record." As an additional
precaution, all criminal record information distributed by a criminal justice agency was
required to contain this notice: "All persons are advised that the information contained
in this report can only be considered accurate for a period of six months from the date of
this report. After such time this report should be considered inaccurate and should not
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DOCTRINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The common law of torts has never completely defined the bounds
of the invasion of privacy remedy. Because almost all cases reported in
appellate opinions are instances of intentional behavior, we have little
guidance with regard to negligent or innocent dissemination."3 Similar-
ly, if the data disseminated is not "intimate" information, the disclosure
of which would shock the sensibilities of an ordinary person, the remedy
might not apply. The reasons that personal compilations "leak" from
credit bureaus and law enforcement agencies range from bribed or
spiteful employees to employees who are recklessly indifferent to the fact
that the data refers to a human being. Additionally, there are those
who normally are conscientious but have a careless moment in failing to
secure the data system or in failing to verify the identity and need to
know of a data recipient.
If one assumes that a prudent actor could have avoided dissemi-
nating the data, it becomes important to consider whether data custodi-
ans owe a duty to file subjects. By virtue of the fact that they have a
measure of control over the data system, the agencies or companies
would seem to have such a duty.54  Similarly, employees and agents
who initiate action to process the data in such a way that it falls into the
hands of a person without a recognized need to know should have a
duty arising out of misfeasance.
There remains the nagging question whether the negligent breach
of duty suggested above really causes the type of injury that a finder of
fact can redress with a monetary award. If the recipient was not a
person about to offer employment, settle or litigate a personal injury
lawsuit, extend credit, underwrite insurance, or confer a security clear-
ance and if the data was not intimate, economic injuries may not exist;
and dignitary injuries may be so ephemeral as to deserve only a nom-
inal award.
Two related phenomena suggest a countervailing policy, however.
There has been some tendency, especially in government agencies, to
merchandise salient portions of personal compilations in list form to
commercial enterprises. To the extent that providing the information
be relied upon for any purpose." Law of July 8, 1975, ch. 786, § 4a, [1975] Ore.
Laws - (repealed 1975).
53. Even modem privacy legislation only confers the civil damage remedy or
imposes the criminal sanction in the event of "knowing," "intentional" and "willful"
violations of the law. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552a(g) (4), (i) (Supp. 1976).
54. See Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116, 1122-26 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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initially is either coerced by law (e.g., business relationships in tax
returns and security registration statements) or is required to obtain a
governmental license (e.g., applying for a private pilot's license), 5  or is
derived from a particular purpose disclosure without warning of broader
use (e.g., requesting free information concerning hearing problems and
ending up on a hearing aid manufacturer's mailing list), this practice
debases an individual's sense of self identity and choice of relationships.
Secondly, there is need to deter the general tendency of large institu-
tions, whether governmental or private, to act oppressively or inhibit-
ingly toward individuals who realize they are "en dossier." 56 Often the
realization is incomplete, but its very incompleteness may produce anxi-
ety, inhibition and other psychic crippling if the location, extent, and
accuracy of the compiled data cannot be learned. Those most vulnera-
ble to such anxieties, those most in need of "a fresh start in the
colonies," may be those whose dossiers would detail past failures or
embarrassments. But even the most successful among us should be
nervous over the potential of unnecessary broadcasting of the details of
our lives.
A certain amount of digitation is desirable and innevitable as
automated data processing contributes sorely needed efficiency to the
complex information needs of our society. Reasonable people may well
differ as to the seriousness of the threat posed to our self identity by
appearing on a mailing list. But if the familiarity of constant associa-
tion with quantized data can lead to contemptuous indifference toward
the individuals the data describes, strong deterrents to data misuse must
be provided.
STATUTORY REMEDIES
In the context of institutional data custodians, it seems desirable to
proscribe certain disseminations and to define a priori safeguards in
55. See A. MILLER, supra note 22, at 98.
56. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958-); United States v.
Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 57-58 (1953) (concurring opinion); cf. Talley v. California, 362
U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960). In Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971), the
court said:
Systematic recordation and dissemination of information about individual
citizens is a form of surveillance and control which may easily inhibit freedom
to speak, to work, and to move .... If information available to Gov-
ernment is misused to publicize past incidents in the lives of its citizens
the pressures for conformity will be irresistible. Initiative and individuality
can be suffocated and a resulting dullness of mind and conduct will become
the norm.
Id. at 726. Some constraints on transfers of data between federal agencies are provided
in 44 U.S.C. § 3508 (1970) (nonconfidentiality, consent, independent power to collect).
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addition to allowing a tort remedy for those victimized. To this end,
statutes and supporting regulations are the best vehicle. The Fair
Credit Reporting Act is a notable effort in this direction. 7 The bill had
a dramatic and turbulent evolution in Congress, but the legislation that
emerged created some significant limitations on credit bureau behav-
ior. s
The utility of the Act to curb abuses may be somewhat illusory,
however, since there is a gap in the notification procedure. It is true
that individuals are to be notified when a credit investigation of them is
requested and are informed that they can request and receive a summary
of the credit report generated by the investigation."9 However, at the
time of requesting credit the subject is often not concerned about the
current report or, alternatively, fears jeopardizing the transaction pend-
ing by requesting the report.60 If an individual either persuades the
credit bureau of an inaccuracy or wishes to file unilaterally a dissenting
declaration, he or she is entitled to notification of the fact that the
bureau will send, on request, amended reports to recent recipients. 1
Because the individual's rights under the Act are not known to the
average person, these notification provisions are obviously crucial to its
efficacy as a curb to credit bureau inaccuracies and abuses. The most
recent credit experiences of the individual may be remembered by him
or her as innocuous enough; yet damaging and inaccurate material can
be found in either investigative reports or one-sided reports of recent
transactions. The only way for an individual to benefit from the
statutory rights with regard to correction and updating of credit data is,
of course, to see the file. But the right of access to the file is not
required to be explained or mentioned in the first or second notices. Due
to the absence of this crucial intermediate link, all but the most preju-
diced or the most suspicious and determined individuals (or those who
can afford to consult an attorney) will fail even to learn of the erroneous
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1970).
58. See A. MILLER, supra note 22, at 86-88.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1681d (1970).
60. It is true that whenever a detrimental decision with regard to insurance, credit
or employment is based in whole or in part on a consumer report, the file subject is to be
notified by the report user of the name and address of the reporting agency. Id. §
1681m(a). As to such detrimental decisions in the credit area alone and when they are
based on reports not compiled by consumer reporting agencies, notification of the right
to request disclosure of the reasons for the decision is required. id. § 1681m(b).
However subsection (b) would not apply to the typical case and even then falls short of
the most meaningful notification.
61. Id. §§ 1681g-i.
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material if it exists. Since the third notification (concerning the update
rights) is only sent after a correction has been demanded"2 and few
would seek a correction until after they had seen the entire file, this
could turn out to be an empty gesture. The notification is important for
those who reach the point of seeing an error in their file and should be
preserved. However, to achieve the intended objectives, the notification
gap must be corrected.
The Act provides civil redress for individuals who suffer actual loss
due to negligent noncompliance with the Act. 3 There is also provision
for punitive damages when the defendant acted in knowing noncompli-
ance.64 Credit information pertaining to transactions more than speci-
fied numbers of years in the past must be omitted from reports in all but
exceptional cases.6 5 Only specified entities may receive credit reports
and investigative reports.6 6 Procedures are to be employed by the
bureaus to increase the accuracy of the data maintained and disseminat-
ed.6 7  Whether the drafting loopholes and the timidity of file subjects
reduce the Act to the political gesture category as its critics imply68 or
whether there is a de minimus number of abuses as the industry sug-
gests69 remains to be seen. Whatever the reason, there have been few
appellate decisions since enactment of the Act despite a substantial
62. Id. § 1681i(d).
63. Id. § 1681o. But see id. § 1681h(e), which raises questions regarding a
consumer's ability to maintain a defamation or negligence action against a reporting
agency on the basis of information discovered through file access. There apparently has
been no judicial interpretation of the scope of section 1681h(e).
64. Id. § 1681n(2). For a decision awarding $25,000 in punitive damages for
FCRA violations see Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Mo.
1974).
65. For bankruptcies the period is fourteen years before the report date; for
judgments, seven years or the statute of limitations, whichever is longer; for criminal
records, seven years. These chronological cutoffs do not apply to credit transactions or
life insurance involving $50,000 or more or employment at an annual salary of $20,000
or more. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (1970).
66. See note 26 supra.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e (1970). The statute requires the agencies to "maintain"
and "follow reasonable procedures" to insure compliance with disclosure limitations and
file accuracy. In the area of disputes with a file subject over accuracy, the agency may
decline to make changes or additions if it has "reasonable grounds to believe that the
dispute by the consumer is frivolous or irrelevant" Similary, it can refuse to transmit
the consumer's statement of dispute. Id. § 1681i. However, harassment of agencies by
crank complaints is felt to be negligible. In fact, nearly all of the subject access
interviews do lead to some modifications of the file but these are predominantly updates
and improvements rather than disputes. Telephone interview with Barry Connelly, su-
pra note 19. These additions are in the best interests of all parties concerned.
68. See, e.g., A. Mi.LER, supra note 22, at 88.
69. See Hearings on HR. 16340 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 122, 458-505 (1970).
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number of file subject accesses. 70 An alternative explanation could be
that there are abuses, but, that since the most common injuries (incon-
venience and temporary embarrassment) are not worth much in com-
pensation, few persons sustain enough "actual losses" to make suit
worthwhile. If this is the correct explanation, it is doubtful that the
threat of a rare lawsuit will be sufficient to alter bureau procedures.
The Act could, nevertheless, have a desirable impact if coupled with
media publicity and employee training programs.
In the criminal justice area, Iowa was the first state to enact a
tough record-privacy statute,"' and bills concerning criminal record
privacy were introduced in several state legislatures in 1975 .72
A substantially amended version of Senator Sam Ervin's privacy
bill was enacted on the last day of the Ninety-Third Congress. 3  This
legislation employs an omnibus approach and covers virtually all records
pertaining to and identifiable by reference to individuals and main-
tained, used, collected, or disseminated by virtually all federal agen-
cies. 74  Transmission of such data from a non-law enforcement agency
to an authorized law enforcement agency can only be accomplished if a
written request is received from the agency head. 7  File subjects are
granted access to their records and an opportunity to request corrections
or additions and file a statement of disagreement if such a request is
refused. 76  Agencies are required to deal, insofar as is practicable,
70. In 1972 members of the Associated Credit Bureaus reported 1,713,000 file
disclosures. They estimate there were approximately two million disclosures (on a base
of 100 million credit reports) in 1974. Of the 1972 disclosures, 1,304,000 or around
seventy-five percent were triggered by a notice of denial of oredit. The average cost to
the agency of such disclosure interview is thought to be between $2.60 and $3.00. There
were 74,000 consumer statements entered in 1972 by ACB members indicating that bona
fide unresolvable disputes arose in about 4 Y29% of the cases where disclosures were
made. Telephone interview with Barry Connelly, supra note 19.
71. iowA CoDE Am. § 749B (Cum. Supp. 1976). For an outline of the suggested
contents of a privacy statute see Comment, Privacy, Law Enforcement, and Public Inter-
est: Computerized Criminal Records, 36 MoNT. L. REv. 60 (1975).
72. See, e.g., [1975-1976] Cal. Gen. Sess., chs. 883 (no public agency can require
disclosure by an applicant for registration or license of arrests not leading to conviction
or nolo contendere plea), 904 (allowing court to order sealing of arrest record followed
by acquittal based on "factual" innocence), 1043 (prohibiting employers from asking
questions about arrests not leading to convictions or not pending trial disposition at any
stage of employment or employment application). See also CAL. PENAL CoDE § 11124
(Supp. 1975) (conferring right of criminal history file subject review).
73. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896, § 3 (codified at 5
U.S.C.A. § 552a (Supp. 1976)).
74. The definition of a federal agency is found at 5 U.S.C. § 551(l) (1970) and 5
U.S.C.A. § 552{e) (Supp. 1976) (added in 1-974-over a presidential veto).
75. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b)(7) (Supp. 1976).
76. Id. § 552a(d).
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directly with the file subject whenever the information needed could
result in "adverse determinations about an individual's rights, benefits
and privileges under Federal programs."' 77 Notice is required to inform
the public of the procedures to be utilized for any individual to deter-
mine whether an agency has a file pertaining to him or her.
78
Civil remedies include federal judicial review of agency refusals to
correct or to grant access and actual damages in cases of "intentional or
willful" inaccuracies or violations of disclosure restraints. 79  Intentional
violations of disclosure and notice requirements are misdemeanors sub-
ject to fines of up to 5,000 dollars.80  Political surveillance material may
not be maintained although law enforcement agencies are exempted
from that prohibition as long as the data is "pertinent to" and "within
the scope of" the agency's activity.8 '
Notwithstanding the salutory objectives and comprehensive ap-
proach to the Act, law enforcement agencies are permitted to institute
rulemaking proceedings for the purpose of exempting their record sys-
tems from certain of its provisions."2 Among the avoidable provisions
are the subject's right of access to the file, the subject's right to know if a
file is being maintained on him or her, and the ability to learn who has
accessed the file.8 3 The extent to which law enforcement agencies
will succeed in exempting their record systems is as yet undetermined.
State agencies that handle criminal history information the process-
ing of which is funded in whole or in part by Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration (LEAA) funds are subject to federal regula-
tion. Recently promulgated LEAA regulations suggest that states
maintain a central repository, and require that a record of the disposi-
tion of an arrest be sent to the repository within the seemingly lengthy
period of ninety days following such disposition.8 4  The burden is on
77. Id. § 552a(e)(2).
78. Id. § 552a(e) (4) (G).
79. Id. § 552a(g) (4). There is a minimum civil recovery of $1,000.00. Id.
80. Id. § 552a(i).
81. Id. § 552a(e) (7).
82. Id. § 552a(j)-(k). The reasons for any exemptions must be annually re-
ported to Congress by the President. Id. § 552a(p).
83. Id. 00 552a(j)-(k). Understandably, law enforcement agencies will want to
exempt subject access from investigatory or intelligence data. Even here, however, the
agency must disclose such data to the subject if he or she is "denied any right, privilege
or benefit that he would otherwise be entitled by Federal law, or for which he would
otherwise be eligible, as a result of the maintenance of such material." Id. §
552a(k) (2). Other types of record systems which may be exempted include secret
service investigations, federal employment investigations and test results, and armed
forces promotion evaluation data. Id. 00 552a(k) (3), (5)-(7).
84. 28 C.F.R. § 20.21(a)(1) (1975). See also the amendments to these regula-
tions in 41 FED. REo. 11714-18 (1976).
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disseminating agencies to query the state repository before local dis-
semination, and originating and repository agencies must notify all
criminal justice agencies known to have previously received the rel-
evant data of any errors subsequently discovered.8 Direct or indirect
employee requests for verification of the non-existence of a criminal
record are forbidden.86 These audits are to be done in a "representative
sample of State and local . . . agencies chosen on a random basis."'81
The length (chronologically speaking) of the audit trail is not specified,
although a paragraph requiring that the file subject be given, on request
after a record correction, the names of all non-criminal justice agencies
accessing challenged data could be read to suggest an openended
period. 8  Private entities may access non-conviction records if they are
"authorized by statute, ordinance, executive order, or a court rule . . .
as construed by appropriate date or local official or agency. 89  Since
state law enforcement agencies, especially those which are endeavoring
to automate their criminal history files, are frequently heavily dependent
on LEAA funds, these regulations should have a substantial and early
impact.
As in credit reporting, the ideal statute allows the obviously neces-
sary practices of data gathering and recordkeeping to continue, but
places constraints on access and dissemination, allows some measure of
subject access and corrective or explanatory input, and provides civil
remedies for noncompliance. The nationwide shift toward automated
information systems not only increases the complexity of the problem
but also suggests that negligence-proof procedures can be developed and
better monitoring can be achieved.90 Budget-conscious law enforce-
ment agencies can be expected to raise cost-benefit objections to such
legislation. The cost of software and storage to implement safeguards
can be quantified and concededly is not negligible.9' In contrast, injury
to the file subject and the indirect injury to society from confidentiality
abuses are very difficult to quantify. Moreover, there is the implied
85. Id. §§ 20.21(a)(1)-(2). The obligation of prior verification is suspended in
cases where "time is of the essence and the repository is technically incapable of
responding within the necessary time period." Id.
86. Id. §§ 20.3(k), 20.21(b) & (c), as amended, 41 FEn. REG. 11715 (1976). The
limits do not apply to conviction data. Id. For one state's attempt to legislate similar
limits see note 140 infra.
87. Id. § 20.21(e), as amended, 41 FED. REG. 11716 (1976).
88. See id.
89. Id. § 20.21(g) (4).
90. See A. WESTIN & M. BAKER, supra note 19, at 268.
91. See generally L. HOFF AN, SEcuRrry AND PRivAcY IN CoMPUTER SYsTEMs
(1973).
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argument that privacy safeguards are implemented at the expense of
efficient law enforcement.
Even among those who agree that some statutory safeguards must
be provided, there are differing approaches. Politicians and law en-
forcement professionals often favor a brief policy-oriented statute dele-
gating authority to promulgate implementing regulations to law enforce-
ment agencies. A statutory privacy commission might be a satisfactory
alternative.12 If no such commission is created, the most logical agency
to draft and enforce the regulations is usually the state police. With
regard to personnel screening, training programs and physical and
electronic security, the problems are best handled by the agency that
manages the system.93 However, on broader issues such as rights of file
subjects, standards for audit of performance, need to know, and con-
straints on dissemination, the regulation model seems less satisfactory.
Even if one assumes that typical administrative procedure act public
hearings are held before the proposed regulations become final, the
theme and main outlines of the safeguard program will be almost
irrevocably set in advance. Understandably, the drafters will choose to
regulate in a manner which will minimize costs, difficulties, and embar-
rassments; indeed, to do otherwise would probably be contrary to their
overall management objectives. But this commendable sense of internal
efficiency makes them ill suited to draft regulations dealing with a
problem that has important external as well as internal ramifications.
92. The Privacy Act of 1974 creates a Privacy Protection Study Commission of
seven appointed persons chosen for their expertise in the areas of civil rights, law,
computer technology and records management among others. In addition to its investi-
gatory, analysis, assistance and recommendatory powers, the Commission can, "upon
request, prepare model legislation for use by State and local governments." Act of Dec.
31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, §§ 5(b)-(d), 88 Stat. 1896.
The MODEL STATE AcT FOR CRIMiNAL OFFENDER REcORD INFoRMATIoN, drafted by
the staff of System for Electronic Analysis and Retrieval of Criminal Histories (funded
by participating states and LEAA), contained provisions for a Criminal Offender
Records Control Committee, id. § 4 (law enforcement officials to promulgate regula-
tions), and for a Security and Privacy Council, id. § 5 (nine members including some
from outside the criminal justice community). Recent legislation in Oregon provided for
a Criminal Record Council of nine appointed persons to advise the Governor and
approve of rules adopted by him to implement criminal record privacy and security
requirements, as well as record verification and operational audits. Law of July 8, 1975,
ch. 786, §§ 7-7b, [1975] Ore. Laws -. The legislation was subsequently repealed, how-
ever, due to an inadvertant defect. Law of Sept. 16, 1975, ch. 1, [1975 Special Session]
Ore. Laws -. See note 140 infra for a discussion of the difficulties that befell the
Oregon act.
93. See Appendix § 11(1). However, even the relatively exemplary New York
State Identification and Intelligence System was found by state auditors to have failed to
control access by federal employees, to institute a formal employee training program, and
to utilize security clearance for internal access. A. WtsiN & M. BAKER, supra note 19,
at 312-13.
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Moreover, public input tends to be largely responsive rather than crea-
tive. Criticism runs to suggestions for a better phrase here and the
deletion of a word there, or to emotional objections that the whole
scheme is unacceptable. Seldom are any substantial alternatives pro-
posed to displace or modify the general thrust or tenor of the proposed
rules. The trade-offs and overall policies decided upon by the drafters
usually emerge unchanged.
For this reason it seems extremely desirable that the social policies,
the economic sacrifices, and the procedural balance points be definitive-
ly determined by the elected representatives of the people, however
difficult and politically nerve-racking that may be. The interdependen-
cies are fairly complex; a certain amount of technological understanding
is required; and not all political constituencies can be satisfied. Thus
legislators must work hard and make politically sensitive trade-offs. Still,
this is the legislature's function, and the competing public interests make
it the most appropriate body to grapple with the problems and resolve
the tensions. A model statute has been drafted by the author and
reprinted in the Appendix to this article.
Proposed Statutory Solution
It is by no means straightforward to define the types of criminal
records systems to be covered by a statute. Computerized systems are
capable of instantaneously interfacing with remote terminals and thus
present aggravated problems in verifying the accessor's identity and
need to know. On the other hand, systematic and automatic procedures
for verification and updating of data are available in computerized
systems. Finally, the technological aspects of systems using dedicated
computer storage, remote online terminals, hard copy printers, and
common carrier communications networks are sufficiently complex that
accurate and discriminating definitions must be employed. 4
Equally difficult is the task of defining what data shall come within
the purview of the statute. In addition to careful, inclusive use of
terminology, conceptual problems arise. Are traffic violations to be
lumped with felonies and other misdemeanors? Are juvenile custodial
reports to be treated like arrests? Are pre-sentence investigation reports
objective or subjective? What if law enforcement personnel assist in the
search for a missing person? Should the use of intelligence data be
constrained?95 The approach taken in the draft statute was to focus on
94. See Appendix §§ 1(2) (information system); 1(12) (purge); 1(13) (seal).
95. See id. §§ 4(3)(h) (disclosure of traffic convictions); 8(2) (forfeiture of bail
in traffic citations); 1(4), 8(7) (juvenile custody reports and sealed records); 1(3)
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"compilations,"-data that is organized around or can be retrieved by
or manipulated through an individual's identity referent.9 6  Since the
greatest threats to privacy arise when criminal justice data is collated
and aggregated to focus on particular individuals, constraining the use
of compilations should produce the greatest protection at the least cost.
A further problem in any comprehensive statutory approach is to
define subsets of criminal justice information. Access criteria will vary
with functional purpose and content sensitivity.9 7  Correctional infor-
mation, for example, may include both subjective and objective data. It
may be appropriate to disclose some portions while disclosure of other
portions would unquestionably be detrimental to the rehabilitative
process.98
Constraints on access will be ineffective if the definitions of users
and types of inputs and readouts are lacking in precision and clarity.99
For example, the draft act definition of "disposition" presented difficul-
ties due to the wide variety of post-arrest events that should be record-
ed.' 00 Since the statute would require erasure of references to disposi-
tions reflecting innocence, 101 the problem was further complicated.
The draft statute attempts to curtail abuses of the possession of the
compiled data inside the criminal justice agencies by requiring a need to
know for initial access and hard copy production. 0 2 Although such
standards can be articulated, there is reason to believe that employee
indifference and competing job priorities will cause such standards to be
often disregarded. If this is so, the incremental gains of such safeguards
may not equal their incremental costs.
As systems become networked and linked to criminal justice agen-
cies in other states, the problem of enforcing safeguards becomes acute.
(pre-sentence investigation reports); 6 (missing persons); 1(9) (intelligence data); 12
(intelligence data).
96. See id. § 1(1).
97. Compare id. H9 1(3), 5(1) (b) (access for research) with id. § 4(3) (potential
employers) and id. § 3 (1) (out-of-state law enforcement agencies).
98. Se e, e.g., Turner v. Reed, 538 P.2d 373 (Ore. App. 1975) (psychiatric
examination reports and information concerning family life of prison inmate exempt
from disclosure but purely factual data used by parole board not exempt).
99. E.g., Appendix § 1(14) (criminal justice agency); 1(11) (dissemination);
1(15) (hard copy); 1(17), 9(3)-(6) (audit entry).
100. See id. § 1(10). See also Alexander & Waiz, Arrest Record Expungement in
California, 9 U.S.F.L. Rv. 299, 302 n.15 (1974), quoting CAL. PEN. CODE § 11116
(West 1970).
101. See Appendix § 8(2).
102. See id. § 2(1).
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Apart from questions of extraterritorial power and federalism, °3 severe
difficulties arise in preventing access by agencies not under similar
constraints. The networks can operate automatically, i.e. without hu-
man intervention, and instantaneously (assuming the retrieval computer
is "on line"). The model statute attempts to solve this issue by the use
of standing interagency covenants (treaties) providing that the request-
ing agency is aware of and will comply with the constraints applicable to
access and dissemination in the repository agency's state.1'
The question whether employers should be able to access or receive
criminal justice information concerning employees and job applicants is
evenly balanced. It must be conceded that a great many people believe
that, all other things being equal, the applicant with a conviction record
should not get the job over an applicant who has no nontraffic convic-
tions. Unlike racial or sexual discrimination, it can be argued that such
discrimination is not based on mere suspicion or unfounded notions of
inferiority, but rather is predicated upon a historical demonstration of
anti-social behavior. Whether this distinction would be broad enough
to survive a job-related requirements test in state or federal regulations
designed to protect ex-convicts remains to be seen.1°5 The widely held
belief that an employer has an inalienable right to hire whom he pleases
and that in order to exercise that right he is entitled to check applicants'
criminal records also seems dubious. Such diverse constraints as union
shops (reached via collective bargaining agreements) and minority
hiring quotas (required under government procurement contracts)
would seem to have already eroded this employer prerogative' 0 which,
in any event, is not a fundamental freedom of federal constitutional
stature."'
7
The statute strives for a compromise by allowing selective release of
some criminal justice information to some employers when a functional
nexus is evident."' 8 There is an attempt to control secondary use and
103. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
104. See Appendix §§ 3(1)-(2).
105. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Civil Rights Act of 1964
and racially selective employment tests),
106. The employer could claim that contractual agreements are consensual and not
external constraints. However, sometimes its bargaining power may be so weak that it
has little alternative except to liquidate its business.
107. In the absence of legislation compelling a contrary result, such employment
discrimination could continue in cases in which state action could not be proven.
However, if and when the legislature saw fit to proscribe such employment practices, the
employer's "right" would be terminated absent a showing of a job-relatedness.
108. See Appendix § 4(3).
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dissemination by placing restraints on the recipients (employers) of this
information.' 9 Violation of these restraints can give rise to criminal
prosecutions.110
Access for court administration and sociological research purposes
is allowed by the draft act. Some research access proposals allow access
only when the result is to be collectivized, statistical findings. Case
history longitudinal studies may need to focus on selected individuals,
however, and this type of research can be highly useful in corrections
work. In any event, nondisclosure agreements or similar safeguards
against the public dissemination of the actual identities of living file
subjects should be insisted upon. L
In addition to disclosures for law enforcement and employment
purposes, -there are often other justifiable reasons for disclosing criminal
justice information. The statute would allow probation and parole
officers to represent orally the substance of file information to assist in
the social, economic and educational rehabilitation of criminals."12
Judges are allowed to reveal such selected criminal justice information
through comments in open court and published opinions and orders as,
in their discretion, is appropriate for the overall purposes of the criminal
law.
1" 3
In the controversial area of arrest records," 4 the model statute
requires purging of records of arrests only when no disposition is shown,
charges have been dropped, probable cause was not found, there has
been a decision not to prosecute, or there has been an acquittal on the
merits." 5 A record of an arrest followed by an acquittal based on
insanity or a pardon must be retained, as must a record followed by a
109. See id. § 4(4).
110. See id. § 13(5).
111. See id. §§ 5(4)-(6). See State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wash. 2d 12, 482
P.2d 775 (1971) (researchers denied access to files of individual randomly selected
mental institution inmates despite offer of confidentiality).
112. Appendix § 7(1). The consent of the file subject is required. This feature
may draw the objection that only positive material would be released. However it should
be remembered that if the criminal justice information were job-related, it would be
accessible to an employer in any event. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
Moreover, a parole officer is not precluded from giving a general opinion (as contrasted
to specific record information) about the character, stability and rehabilitative prospects
of a person under his jurisdiction even without the consent of such person.
113. Id. § 7(2). This is similar to the absolute immunity enjoyed by judges under
defamation law, but is phrased to encourage greater sensitivity and discretion on the part
of the judiciary.
114. See text accompanying notes 48-52 supra.
115. Appendix § 8(2).
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conviction, guilty plea or nolo contendere plea, 16 since all of these
dispositions are consistent with a justifiable (after the fact) arrest.
The difficulties of "tracking" arrest dispositions from law enforce-
ment agencies to prosecutors' offices to courts to record custodians are
manifest. The statute places the initial burden of updating arrest
information with disposition data on the agency that originated the
original entry. It additionally places an obligation on the information
system to query the originating agency every ninety days until a perma-
nent disposition is reflected. If eighteen months pass without a disposi-
tion and the arrestee has not been a fugitive during such period, the
arrest record shall be purged in all but intelligence files.'17 It has been
suggested that prosecution be barred if the trial is not commenced
within some finite, relatively short time as an alternative to purging the
arrest record.""' Salutory as this limitation might be, it does not
necessarily insure that the disposition will reach the compilation and be
linked to the arrest record. Nor does it erase the potential stigma of
having an arrest record even when there is also a record of a subsequent
acquittal."l 9
There may be circumstances in which criminal justice officials feel
strongly that records of arrests not followed by a disposition should not
be purged. Provision is made in the draft act for the agency to
administratively petition the governor to retain such records. 20  Unlike
some public records legislation in which the burden of proof is on the
entity seeking nondisclosure,' 21 the burden under the proposed draft
would be on the agency seeking retention.
122
The proposed statute does not purport to address the broader
questions of when and why conviction records or juvenile records should
116. Id. A pardon is sometimes unrelated to guilt (e.g., when material exonerating
evidence comes to light after trial) but is included as a basis for retaining the arrest
record since other criminal justice records, e.g., criminal court and corrections, inevitably
will have been generated in such cases, the arrest will have been supported by probable
cause, and the pardon does not invariably reflect complete innocence.
117. Id. §§ 8(2)-(5).
118. For an example of federal legislation passed primarily for other reasons, but
incidentally having this effect, see Federal Speedy Trials Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161 (Supp.
1976).
119. See notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra.
120. Appendix § 8(6).
121. See, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 192.500(2) (a), (d) (1973).
122. An admittedly difficult case would involve an acquittal based on a bill of rights
issue where objective evidence indicated guilt. The bracketed language in section 8(6)
of the draft statute is an attempt to cope with this situation, but it must be admitted that
any such criteria are extremely difficult to formulate and may be politically unacceptable
as well.
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be sealed or expunged. It does, however, require a procedure to be
followed by criminal justice record custodians should a court order or
statute require sealing or purging. 2 '
Seemingly implicit in conferring on a file subject the right to
examine and suggest corrections to his or her compilation is the right to
know to whom the compilation has been disseminated.12 Only in this
way can the subject be personally assured that past recipients of prejudi-
cial errors have been notified of the inaccuracy. Even when errors are
discovered through internal audit procedures, a log of who has received
information from the file is necessary to send out corrections. Both
manual and automated systems can maintain such logs, known in the
jargon as "audit trails." Access to a compilation, whether stored in a
computer or in manual files, can take several forms and have various
purposes (e.g., read-in, read-out, process). Thus, care must be used in
defining when an audit entry is required and what, at a minimum, the
entry must include. 2
5
It is one thing to statutorily require audit entries for the production
of hard copies or for manually accessed files, but it is quite another to
enforce such a requirement. Training and education can help, and the
deterrent effect of the criminal sanction may also play a role. Compu-
terized systems can be programmed to deny access until an audit entry
has been tendered, but no such leverage exists once the data is outside
the computer files. The proposed legislation proceeds on the assump-
tion that it is better to require audit trails than to leave the safeguards
entirely to the day-to-day care and good faith of the system operators. 26
The chronological length of the audit trail determines the com-
pleteness of the correction of erroneous data. Since longer trails take
more space in computer storage, they also cost more. The economic
factor is a trade-off that legislatures will have to make. The proposed
statute employs a four-year period.'2 Cheap systems protect less thor-
123. Appendix § 8(7).
124. See id. § 10.
125. See id. §§ 9(3)-(6).
126. The draft statute calls for biennial auditing by the system operators with
reports to the Governor of the findings and corrective actions taken. Id. § 11(5).
Others have recommended that a separate agency should conduct the audit. See TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 47, at 75.
127. Appendix § 9(1). The Privacy Act of 1974 calls for retention of the audit
trail (therein called an "accounting") for five years or the life of the record, whichever is
longer. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(c) (2) (Supp. 1976). Apart from the file-subject's remedies,
an audit trail retention period of at least two years should be employed for internal
training, disciplinary and reprimand procedures.
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oughly; on the other hand, after a sufficient period elapses, it is safe to
assume no future prejudice can befall the file subject and that past
prejudice has become irremediable. 2 3
There is broadly based support for allowing file subjects to exam-
ine compiled criminal justice records. The examination right does not
extend to intelligence data. 2 9 While this distinction may seem hypo-
critical to a privacy, purist, it is rationally supportable if any value is
placed on pre-arrest surveillance and investigation as a weapon to
reduce crime. To further justify this distinction, intelligence data should
not be used for non-law enforcement purposes, and political or ideo-
ological dossiers unrelated to criminal acts should not be maintained.8 0
A concommitant of the right to examine is the procedure for request-
ing corrections, clarifications, or additions to the compiled record.
The model act requires that an explanation of this procedure be
given the subject at the time of the examination.'' If the request is
denied in whole or in part, the file subject may take an administrative
appeal under the state administrative procedure act.8 2 The burden of
justifying the change is placed on the file subject.13 3
Since these procedures all take time, the statute addresses the
problem of contemporaneous dissemination with particularity. Entries
are required to be made so that persons accessing the file will be aware
that a review or challenge is pending.'34 If a permanent change is made
at any administrative level, the system must inform agencies, entities and
other information systems that have accessed the information in the past
of the updated version. 135
The proposed statute does not confer new civil causes of action on
belfalf of file subjects against people outside criminal justice agencies
who access or disseminate data in violation of the statute. It does
preserve whatever rights may exist by common law.' 36 This approach
128. Law enforcement officials contend that no responsible entities work with or
make decisions based upon stale criminal histories and that a much shorter period is
sufficient to protect the file subject.
129. Appendix § 10(5). See also 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552(b)(1)(A)-(B) (Supp. 1976).
130. See id. §§ 3(1)-(2), 12(2).
131. Id. § 10(4).
132. Id. §§ 10(7)-(8), (11)-(13).
133. Id. § 10(13).
134. See id. § 10(9).
135. Id. §§ 10(14)-(15). The "reachback" time is four years for criminal justice
agency recipients and two years for other recipients. Id. Section 10(10) requires all
information systems so notified to change their own records to comport with the updated
version.
136. Id. § 13(4). For a discussion of common law causes of actions and remedies
see Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 177 A.2d 841 (1962) (false light privacy action).
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has, to be sure, some disadvantages since "insiders" may be able to cover
their tracks and the greatest damage may be done by "outsiders." An
additional drawback may be that "insiders" are typically individuals of
modest resources whereas "outsiders" may be sizable corporations.
Since the greatest merit in such a statute is its preventive impact
rather than its remedial impact, it has focused primarily on criminal
sanctions against all violators and on internal safeguards that can be
readily monitored. As a supplementary measure, statutory civil recov-
eries of actual damages (or 1000 dollars, whichever is greater) are
provided against "insiders."'
37
The concept of an independent "watch dog" criminal records
privacy commission has enjoyed considerable currency. 13  The com-
missioners in such models are either wholly public members or are
balanced between law enforcement members and non-law enforcement
members. Such commissions could be authorized to promulgate regula-
tions and safeguards to control the operation of criminal justice data
systems. This approach has not been utilized in the proposed statute.
The effort was to avoid the creation of an additional governmental body
while still achieving the purpose of allowing the administrative resolu-
tion of disputes as to file accuracy, rights to access, and record retention
with an opportunity for judicial review.
The author concedes that this proposal may not be politically
viable, at least as a complete package. The political strengths in this
area tend to be unusually polarized-the American Civil Liberties
Union and others of strong and deeply felt concern about personal
privacy on one side and the law enforcement professionals on the other.
Both sides are in fact willing to make some compromises but the groups
often adopt extremist strategies. Thus, a proposal which attempts to be
"down the middle," treating each subissue on its independent merits,
will not likely gain support from either side. Despite fairly extensive
coverage in the press and in popular books,'39 there is little interest in
criminal justice privacy among law-abiding middle class citizens who
will not identify with the problem even though they could easily become
involved as an employer or a victim of a mistaken identity arrest. Thus,
137. Appendix § 13(1). The Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties
Union, Aryeh Neier, has urged that criminal sanctions be extended to cover "out-
siders" as well as "insiders." See Hearings on H.R. 13315 Before Subcomm. No. 4
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 163 (1972).
138. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 749B.19 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Law of July 8, 1975,
ch. 786, §§ 7-7b, [1975] Ore. Laws - (repealed 1975).
139. E.g., A. MIL.E.a, supra note 22.
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those who are concerned and exert political pressure tend to support
more extreme solutions while those who might perceive the problem and
its solutions more objectively are seemingly not involved.' 40
OTHER AREAS OF ABUSE
Other possible contexts in which one can expect complaints of
misuse of accurate information are commercial and political competi-
tion. A manufacturer might hire an investigator to uncover an embar-
rassing quality control error by the competition or to catalogue manu-
facturing liability lawsuits filed against a competitor. Assuming
140. The State of Oregon enacted criminal records privacy legislation in 1975 and
the story of its development and subsequent repeal is worth noting. The Oregon Law
Enforcement Council (OLEC) consists predominantly of legislators and law enforce-
ment officials and is appointed by the Governor. The Council designated a task force of
its members and a few ex officio members representing, inter alia, the ACLU, and an
urban public defender office to draft a criminal record privacy bill for eventual
presentation to the legislature. The drafting process took nearly nine months and the
legislature was already in session when the eleventh draft from the task force was
presented to a plenary meeting of the OLEC. The prevailing sentiment on the OLEC
was diametrically opposed to limits on dissemination of arrest records. As a result, this
aspect of the draft legislation was eviscerated.
The OLEC bill was strenuously attacked during hearings before the House Judiciary
Committee. Consequently, the majority of the Committee passed out a bill (H.B. 2579)
on April 21, 1975, which went considerably beyond the OLEC Task Force's eleventh
draft in protecting privacy. This bill passed on the floor of the House on April 24 by a
moderately wide margin despite support for the Committee minority's compromise
version. During hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, LEAA regulations
pertaining to criminal records systems receiving LEAA funding were promulgated. In an
effort to tighten the coverage of the bill and, at the same time, to comply with LEAA
regulations, the ACLU representative convinced the Committee in the closing days of
the session to employ the LEAA definitions nearly verbatim. Through inadvertance,
however, the correlative LEAA exemptions were not incorporated. Several days after
the House vote, the omission was discovered, but rather than pull the bill back from the
floor of the Senate, a separate bill (S.B. 716) was developed to cure the defect. Both
bills eventually passed the Senate, on June 9 and 13, respectively, and were sent to the
House. Lack of awareness of the significant interdependence of the two bills and last-
minute parliamentary maneuverings on the floor of the House resulted in passage of the
basic bill on June 10 although the corrective bill never was debated or put to a vote.
Just before the effective date, September 13, 1975, law enforcement officials realized
the impact of the now overinclusive legislation. An Opinion of the Attorney General
dated September 9 confirmed their interpretation that the news media were totally
foreclosed from access to criminal justice records. This led to intense publicity by the
news media with front page coverage on successive days stressing the first amendment
implications and characterizing the act as police-state legislation. Final Legis. Calendar,
Regular Sess. 1975, 58th Legis. Assembly of the State of Oregon, H-87 to -88. The
Governor called a special session of the legislature and, although there was a half-
hearted attempt to amend the bill to include the omitted exemptions and to clarify an
ambiguity regarding next-of-kin notifications, the entire statute was repealed at a one-day
session on September 16, 1975. Law of Sept. 16, 1975, ch. 1, [1975 Special Sess.] Ore.
Laws --.
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unflattering discoveries were made, he could then utilize the material in
an advertising campaign. Similarly, such information could be used by
lobbyists urging legislation designed to impede the competition. Propo-
nents of ideological ballot measures or candidates for elective office
could employ the same tactics. 4 Generally, the use of information in
such ways is protected on first and fourteenth amendment principles
142
or under the right to petition the government.143  But the so-called
"commercial speech" exception could be applicable to deprive business
competitors of constitutional immunity. 44 Even without specific im-
munity, however, there may be no liability if the use is not tortious
under common law or statutes. The Federal Trade Commission usually
does not attempt to enjoin invidious comparison advertising based on
relevant facts,14 5 and anything that delivers more information to the
marketplace or the governmental decisionmaker is usually counte-
nanced. 140
On balance, the public's need to know would seem to suggest no
recovery for such dissemination. This conclusion has particular force
when qualified privileges (for competitors or those commenting on
public officials and candidates) are available even to those who dissemi-
nate misinformation under the law of defamation.'
47
141. Cf. Corman v. Blanchard, 211 Cal. App. 2d 126, 27 Cal. Rptr. 327 (2d Dist.
1963) (sustaining of demurrer against libel complaint affirmed). Certainly the disclo-
sure of facts about Senator Eagleton's unfortunate medical history was appropriate at the
time of considering the Senator for the Vice Presidential candidacy. See generally Note,
Invasion of Privacy-Disclosure of Contents of Wrongfully Obtained Documents of
Public Figure, 55 MINN. L. REv. 156 (1970).
142. Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964-) (libel of public
official requires showing of recklessness or knowing falsity).
143. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127 (1961).
144. Cf. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376 (1973); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973); Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). But cf. Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
145. See Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HAv. L. R.v. 888, 897
(1964) for the inference that the Federal Trade Commission will not countenance
comparisons based on misleading or irrelevant facts. The Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a) (1973), does not confer private remedies. Smith-Victor Corp.
v. Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 302 (N.D. IIl. 1965).
146. See FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963); cf. In re Cape
Cod Broadcasting Co., 22 F.C.C.2d 403 (1970) (competitor for broadcast license
compelled disclosure of licensee's financial reports submitted to FCC). But cf. In re
Sioux Empire Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C.2d 132 (1967).
147. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public
officials); Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Labs., Inc., 269 F.2d 375 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 893 (1959) (infringement claim); Coleman v. MacLennan, 78
Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908) (candidate).
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CONCLUSION
Tort law provides some protection for victims of unauthorized use
of accurate information by means of the seldom invoked concepts of
prima facie tort and by undue publicity in the invasion of privacy area.
The latter concept is limited, not without some justification, to situations
involving revelations of intimate facts to sizable numbers of people.
With the increasing depersonalization of bureaucratic recordkeeping
and the utilization of computerized data banks, it may be that additional
tort remedies will have to be created by statute. Alternatively, courts
must be ready to hold that data compilers and custodians owe a duty to
the subjects identifiable in the data.1 48  Questions of breach such as
foreseeable consequences and reasonable behavior could be sent to the
jury as in conventional negligence litigation. Damages would be diffi-
cult to quantify and might well be limited to actual losses.'
49
When the "use" of the data is to inform rather than to harm or to
enrich, statutory mandates, common-law privileges and constitutional
guarantees should serve as defenses to tort claims. Although case law
on common-law privileges for invasion of privacy is sparse, they are
usually treated as a fortiori available since they are presently invokable
for untrue statements or misleading depictions.'5 0  To the extent
remedies are created by statutes, conduct of data compilers, custodians
and users can be additionally shaped and protected.
Practitioners and courts should remain alert to recognize the appli-
cation of existing remedies from a variety of areas' l to handle informa-
tion misuse claims. Legislators can play vital roles in creating new
rights, safeguards, and remedies where the existing patchwork is inade-
quate to cope with misuses. When legislation is attempted, it must be
thoughtfully conceived and skillfully drafted to accomodate the complex
social and economic interdependencies. To further aggravate the prob-
lem, the political and emotional conflicts in this area are potentially
large and distracting. Information and communication are vital to our
economy and the preservation of our heritage of democratic government
and personal freedom. Protection for personal privacy is another, at
148. Identification can be based on voice-prints, fingerprints and social security
numbers as well as names. There would seem little need for this duty to continue after
the death of the file subject. Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
149. Out-of-pocket expenses and lost profits or net income losses should be recovera-
ble, but dignitary losses and general damages might be inappropriate.
150. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
151. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970) (securities law violations).
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times conflicting, cherished and constitutionally recognized objective.
1 52
Vigilance, even-handedness, realism, and creativity will be required of
the bar, the bench, and the legislatures to control successfully the misuse
of information.
152. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (investigative
journalist intruding under subterfuge). See generally Note, On Privacy: Constitutional
Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 670 (1973).
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APPENDIX
Following is a proposed statute drafted by the author relating to the use,
monitoring, and dissemination of criminal justice records, intelligence materi-
al, and related data. Sections relating to legislative purpose, preamble,
enacting clause, fiscal provisions, saving and severability clauses, and effec-
tive date are not included. A short title might be "Criminal Justice Data
Security Act of 197_."
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section 1. .. Definitions
Section 2. - Access and Utilization by Criminal Justice Agencies
Section 3. Access and Utilization for Out-of-State Criminal
Justice Agencies
Section 4. --- Access and Utilization by Other Agencies
Section 5. Agencies Specifically Designated for Access; Research
Section 6. - Wanted and Missing Persons
Section 7. Representations by Rehabilitation Personnel and Judges
Section 8. Data to be Purged or Sealed
Section 9. ----- Maintenance of Audit Trails; Details of
Audit Entry
Section 10. Data Subject's Right to Review
Section 11. Administration; Security; Training Programs; Audits
Section 12. .Intelligence and Surveillance Data
Section 13. - Civil Actions; Criminal Sanctions
Section 14.--- Amendments to Other Statutes
Section 1. Definitions.
As used in this Act:
(1) "Individual data compilation" means data stored in an information
system or the output of such a system, whether disseminated or communicat-
ed externally or not and whether in total, edited, encrypted, excerpted,
abbreviated, or summarized form, so long as it is or can be retrieved or
displayed by means of, is or can be communicated in conjunction with, or is
or can be read, utilized, manipulated, or understood in conjunction with an
individual identifier, including but not limited to name, fingerprints, or voice
prints (or alphabetic or numeric codes derivable therefrom), social security
number, or other identity referent.
(2) "Information system" means a system, whether manual, mechani-
cal, electronic, magnetic, or a combination of said types, capable of and used
in whole or in part to collect, process, store, retrieve, display, generate,
compile, or disseminate individual data compilations which is owned, funded,
or operated by or on behalf of, or the outputs of which are used in whole or
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in part by any governmental agency of the State or its political subdivisions.
(3) "Criminal justice information" means information about an individ-
ual collected, generated, or disseminated as a result of an arrest, a receipt
into custody, detention, initiation of or prosecution of proceedings before an
arraigning magistrate, a grand jury, or a court of criminal jurisdiction by a
criminal justice agent, including arrest record information, conviction record
information, and correctional and release information. The term shall not
include statistical or analytical reports or records in which individuals are not
identified and from which their identities are not readily ascertainable or
reasonably inferrable. The term shall not include criminal justice intelli-
gence material, missing persons data, wanted persons information, pre-
sentence report information (except to the extent such a report contains
factual summaries, excerpts or quoted material from data included in the
definition of criminal justice information), or records of violations of local
building or fire codes (excluding the crimes of arson or attempted arson).
(4) "Arrest record information" means information concerning the
arrest of, detention of, or commencement of crminal proceedings against an
individual and, to the extent that a final disposition of the matter has been
reached, the disposition consequent to each such arrest. A juvenile custody
report not related to an arrest shall not be considered an "arrest record" for
purposes of this statute.
(5) "Conviction record information" means information revealing that
a defendant has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere -to or has been convicted
of any criminal offense and also includes information about the sentence
imposed and any withdrawals or modifications of the plea. If an appeal is
pending, indication of such pendency shall also be included and, if the
appeal results in an affirmance of the conviction, an indication of that fact
shall also be included in the definition.
(6) "Correctional and release information" means a record of factual
occurrences concerning an individual and generated by a criminal justice
agency or any other agency in conection with bail, with pre-trial or post-trial
release proceedings (including habeas corpus), with detention in a correc-
tional institution, or escape, release, or transfer therefrom, with detention in
an institution for the criminally insane, with participation in any rehabilita-
tion program with parole or probation and any violations or suspensions
thereof. The term shall also include records of findings, conclusions, and
sanctions, if any, in disciplinary proceedings against individual inmates for
alleged infractions of rules of the institution where the individual was
incarcerated at the -time of the incident in question.
(7) "Wanted persons information" means information aiding in the
identification of any person wanted on an outstanding arrest warrant or
wanted for the contemporaneous commission of a felony. The term includes
the charge for which the warrant was issued or the type of crime contempor-
aneously committed, information relevant to the individual's danger to the
community, and such other information as may reasonably be thought to
facilitate the regaining of the custody of the individual.
(8) "Missing persons data" means information identifying persons
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believed to be missing and also includes information about last known
address, occupation, and vehicle use or ownership.
(9) "Criminal justice intelligence material" means information or con-
clusions based on surveillance, hearsay, investigation, research, or deductive
reasoning relating to (but not limited to) an individual's habits, behavior,
associations, reputation, beliefs, declarations, actions, or participation in
transactions when there is reason to suspect that the individual is involved in
or has participated in criminal activity (including being a fugitive or an
escapee) or is a national security risk. The term also includes military or
alternative service or civil service records, medical, psychiatric, psychological
test results, evaluations, diagnoses, and opinions from whatever source, and
the suspicions and opinions of law enforcement, corrections, human re-
sources, tax collection, pre-sentence investigation or probation personnel.
The term also includes school truancy or disciplinary records, juvenile justice
records, and records of the Family Services Division of the Department of
Human Resources to the extent such material may be assembled in or
retrievable from an information system. Nothing herein alters the confiden-
tiality or public record status or "sealed" status otherwise applicable to such
information pertaining to juveniles.
(10) "Disposition" means an unambiguous description of the action
taken subsequent to an arrest by any criminal justice agency. The term
shall include, but shall not be limited to, decisions not to refer the case
against the individual to a prosecutor, the prosecutor's election not to
commence criminal proceedings against the individual, the death of the
individual prior to plea or trial, indefinite postponement and the reason
therefor, acquittal, acquittal by reason of insanity or diminished responsibili-
ty, charge dismissed or case continued by reason of mental incompetency,
guilty plea, nolle prosequi, no paper, nolo contendere plea, convicted,
extradited, turned over to federal law enforcement authorities for disposition,
pardoned, mistrial-defendant discharged, or executive clemency.
(11) "Disseminate" means to transmit information whether audibly, by
writing, by electromagnetic or visual pulses or waves, by electric voltages or
currents, -by magnetic fields or domains, by printing, by photocopying, or by
any other means of communication and whether in plain text, encrypted, or
abbreviated.
(12) "Purge" means to permanently remove information from an
information system so that there is no identifiable trace or vestige of such
information and no indication that such information was removed.
(13) "Seal" means to preclude access to or knowledge about informa-
tion contained in an information system except in conjunction with a subject
review procedures as provided in Section 10; (b) authorized research as
provided in Section 5; (c) a specific court order as provided in Section 8; or
(d) a security verification random sample audit as provided in Section 11.
(14) "Criminal justice agency" means and is limited to:
(a) The Governor of 'the State or his or her delegate as he
or she (1) is acting as commander-in-chief of the .[State Police];
(2) is considering appointing or offering an appointment to a spe-
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cific individual for a full-time, salaried office, judgeship, commission
or other employment; (3) is considering selecting, nominating,
appointing, or recommending a specific individual for the position
of mediator, conciliator, or arbitrator in a collective bargaining
dispute involving public employees; (4) is hearing, or has appointed
a specific delegate to hear in his behalf, an administrative appeal
under Sections 8(6) or 10(13).
(b) The judges of the courts of criminal jurisdiction in this
State, including juvenile courts hearing criminal charges, and the
staff and employees of said courts;
(c) The Attorney General of this State and his or her deputies
and staff;
(d) District Attorneys and their deputies and staffs;
(e) Law enforcement personnel employed by this State or by
any of its political subdivisions;
(f) Employees of the Corrections Division of the Department
of Human Resources of this State [or equivalent agency];
(g) A member of the State Board of Parole and his or her
staff;
(h) Any employee of any state or local agency designated
by the Governor as provided in Section 5;
(i) The operators or custodians of an information system
containing or handling criminal justice information or criminal
justice intelligence material.
(15) "The administration of criminal justice" means any activity by a
governmental agency or individual personnel thereof involving the apprehen-
sion, detention, pre-trial release, post-trial release, prosecution, defense, or
rehabilitation (including periodic interviews by probation or parole officials
and release or escape data under any applicable statute of this State) of
accused persons or criminal offenders or involving termination of parental
rights or placement of children in foster homes or therapeutic, rehabilitative,
or punitive treatment of persons convicted of or pleading guilty to criminal
offenses involving intoxication or being under the influence of drugs or
involving the collection, storage, dissemination, processing (other than for
transmission), securing, or usage of criminal justice information.
(16) "Hard copy" means a tangible, durable copy, whether visually
interpretable or not, which can exist outside of the information system.
(17) "Audit entry" means a record identifying specifics concerning
incidents of access, input, processing or manipulation, or output involving an
individual data compilation in a given information system as provided in
Section 9 herein.
Section 2. Access and Utilization by Criminal Justice Agencies.
(1) An employee of a criminal justice agency shall have access to
criminal justice information and criminal justice intelligence material con-
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tained in individual data compilations in information systems only when and
to the extent that he or she has a need to know based on (a) a current and
ongoing role in the administration of criminal justice involving, in some
substantial manner, the subject of the compilation; or based on (b) a role in
the administration of personnel, hiring, internal review, or employment
benefits involving the subject of the compilation.
(2) Any person accessing individual data compilations containing
criminal justice information or criminal justice intelligence material in an
information system shall record in the system (or cause the system to
record) the date of access, the agency employing him or her, the person's
own identifying number, whether or not hard copies were made or received
and, if any information was input to the system, a designation of the type or
types of information as defined in Section 1 (4)-(9). Uniform codes or
abbreviations may be developed to facilitate such recordation.
(3) If any person accessing an individual data compilation containing
criminal justice information or criminal justice intelligence material in an
information system procures, generates, or receives a hard copy, or generates
an excerpt, paraphrase, condensation, or like summary in hard copy form, he
or she shall be responsible for either returning the hard copy to a secure
manual information system or else destroying said copy when his or her need
for it has terminated. In the event it is necessary to transfer custody of the
hard copy to another individual authorized by law to keep, view, use, or
access said copy, the first person shall promptly record the details of such a
transfer in the information system. The transferee shall then succeed to like
responsibility for future return, destruction, or transfer. In no event shall
any person make additional copies without recording with the information
system the identity of the custodian of each such copy and without informing
the new custodians of the ongoing responsibilities inherent in possessing such
copies. No dissemination hereunder shall be otherwise 'than in compliance
with Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 11 of this Act as they may respectively apply.
Section 3. Access and Utilization for Out-of-State Criminal Justice Agencies.
(1) Agencies of other states or nations performing functions equivalent
to those performed by agencies in this State designated as criminal justice
agencies may have access to or be recipients of individual data compilations
containing criminal justice information stored or collected by an information
system; provided that:
(a) They declare they have a need to know based on the ad-
ministration of criminal justice involving, in some substantial man-
ner, the subject of the data; and
(b) An audit entry is created in the individual data compila-
tion of the subject in a manner consistent with Section 9(3) herein.
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Such agencies may also have access to or be recipients of individual data
compilations containing criminal justice intelligence material if, in addition to
the above requirements, they declare either:
(c) That the subject individual is wanted in their state as a
fugitive or escapee and his or her whereabouts is either unknown or
known to be in their state; or
(d) That the subject individual has applied for a job with an
agency of their state performing the functions of a criminal justice
agency and the applicant has provided them with a written waiver
allowing them to request, receive, and utilize such information.
Whenever an out-of-state agency otherwise eligible to access or receive
such information has a direct link to an automated or computerized informa-
tion system, the Attorney General of this State shall condition such direct
link on the existence of an agreement by the out-of-state agency involved
that it is aware of the limitations specified herein, including the requisite
need to know and will condition its access to the information system so as to
always fully and simultaneously comply with the requirements of this section.
In all other cases and in the case of accessing criminal justice intelli-
gence material, the agency accessing the information system or receiving the
data therefrom shall provide the information system operators with a hard
copy of the requisite declarations and identifiers contemporaneously with, or
as soon as practicable following, the request for access to or for information
from the information system.
(2) The Federal Bureau of Investigation, its Identification Division, the
National Crime Information Center and federal non-military intelligence
agencies may have access to, by direct link or otherwise, and may receive
data from and input data to individual data compilations in an information
system containing criminal justice information or criminal justice intelligence
material; provided, that the agencies may only input to, access, or receive
data from the information system in pursuance of their administrative
criminal justice function in connection with a federal crime committed or
alleged to have been committed by the subject of the data; or in connection
with assisting state law enforcement authorities when the subject of the data
is a convicted offender under the laws of more than one state or nation; or
when the subject of the data is being considered for a security clearance of
"secret" or higher or for a federal government office, job, or post requiring
approval of one or both houses of Congress; or when the subject of the data
is reasonably believed to constitute or is closely related to someone who is
reasonably believed to constitute a threat to the national security. In no
event shall any such agency input to, access, or receive data from such an
individual data compilation when a purpose of such activity is to facilitate or
accomplish political surveillance of or assemble a political dossier on the
subject of the data or other persons mentioned therein.
The Governor of this State shall obtain the prior written agreement of
all such federal agencies to comply with the above limitations and conditions
upon input, access, and receipt of information. Once such agreement is
obtained, individual certificates of compliance need not be required, al-
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though an audit entry as provided in Section 9 shall be made for each such
incident. Such written agreement shall be reaffirmed at periodic intervals
which shall not exceed two years.
(3) Federal courts and employees thereof, U.S. Attorneys, and their
deputies and staff shall have access to and may receive data from individual
data compilations in an information system containing criminal justice
information to the extent that data therein bears on the merits of any
pending criminal grand jury, prosecution, pre-trial or post-trial release,
habeas corpus proceeding, criminal appeal or sentencing within their jurisdic-
tion.
Section 4. Access and Utilization by Other Agencies.
(1) An information system or its operating personnel may provide the
conviction record information portion of an individual data compilation in
hard copy or otherwise to:
(a) The State Department of Motor Vehicles [or equivalent
agency] to -the extent that data therein pertains to a vehicle code
violation.
(b) The Fish and Game Commission [or equivalent agency]
to the extent that data therein pertains to a violation of the State
fish or game laws.
(c) The Liquor Control Commission [or equivalent agency]
to the extent data therein pertains to violations of law concerning
the sale, possession, or dispensing of alcoholic beverages.
(2) Personnel operating or having authorized access to an information
system may make criminal justice information contained in an individual
data compilation available to:
(a) Counsel of record in a pending indictment, prosecution
or appeal therefrom, civil rights action, or habeas corpus proceed-
ing, upon order 'by the court having jurisdiction over such proceed-
ing;
(b) Officials of juvenile detention facilities, child welfare
workers, and counselors in the Human Relations Division of the
Department of Human Resources [or equivalent agency] when the
individual concerned is the child or juvenile subject of a current or
pending file or of ongoing detention or escape therefrom, or is a
natural parent, guardian, potential guardian, foster parent, or po-
tential foster parent of a child or juvenile who is the subject of a
current or pending file; provided, the requesting party declares in
a writing filed with and recorded in the information system that
she or he has a need to know such information -to adequately carry
out her or his function and agrees not to disseminate the informa-
tion beyond persons in the same agency with a similar need to
know.
(3) Personnel operating or having authorized access to an information
system may make certain information from the arrest record, conviction
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record, and release-parole-probation record portions of an individual data
compilation available upon request to specified would-be or actual employers
strictly on the following basis:
(a) No data shall be disseminated, paraphrased, or sum-
marized hereunder except upon the presentation -and surrender of
an original or certified copy of a written consent to such disclosure
executed by the employee or job applicant indicating the identity
of the corporate personnel manager, or the employer him or herself
if it is not a corporation. The operators of the information system
shall retain said consents in a hard copy file and shall input an
appropriate audit entry to the information system;
(b) Any branch of the armed services of the United States
or the State National Guard may receive all conviction records,
arrest records, and correctional and release information pertaining
to an individual who is attempting to enlist or reenlist or who has
applied for a security clearance or a commission or is under charges
for an infraction of military law; provided that in the latter case
the consent required in subparagraph (3) (a) above need not be
obtained;
(c) Banks, savings and loan associations, finance, and com-
mercial loan companies may receive conviction record information
-to the extent it pertains to the crimes of embezzlement, forgery,
theft, or narcotics sale or use and concerns an employee or a job
applicant;
(d) Hospitals, pharmacies, clinics, infirmaries, convalescent
homes, physicians, osteopaths, and chiropractors may receive
conviction record and correctional information to the extent it per-
tains to crimes involving narcotics or dangerous drugs and concerns
an employee or job applicant;
(e) Public or private schools may receive conviction record
and correctional information -to the extent it pertains to, crimes in-
volving narcotics or dangerous drugs or sexual behavior or -to a
determination of sexual psychopathy or criminal insanity and con-
cerns an employee or a job applicant;
(f) Health spas, gymnasiums, reducing salons, athletic clubs
and facilities, massage parlors, Turkish baths, children's camps,
day-care centers, and park, recreation, and swimming programs may
receive conviction record and correctional information to the ex-
tent that it pertains to crimes involving sexual behavior or to a
determination of sexual psychopathy and concerns an employee or
a job applicant;
(g) Issuers of bail bonds may receive correctional records
pertaining to bail or pre-trial Telease status and conviction and
arrest information concerning individuals who have requested them
to post bail;
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(h) Automobile insurance companies may receive conviction
record information to the extent that it pertains to violations of
the motor vehicle laws of this State without the need of the consent
specified in Section 4(3) (a).
(4) To the extent -that hard copies are disseminated under paragraphs
(1) - (3) of this section, the recipient shall destroy such copies as soon as
the need which justified the original dissemination has terminated. The
recipient and its employees and agents shall not paraphrase, repeat, summa-
rize, or otherwise communicate or disseminate beyond his or her fellow
employees who share his or her need to know the information received under
paragraphs (1) - (3) of this section. A reminder of these requirements
shall be printed or stamped on the face of each page of any hard copies
provided by the information system.
(5) Subject to such specific orders as the courts having jurisdiction
might issue, the news media shall only have access to the pleadings and
orders, decrees, verdicts, and sentences in court proceedings, and to daily
arrest data, including names of arrestees, within twenty-four hours after the
arrest is made, and to convection record information, prison release or es-
cape information immediately following the most recent sentencing or de-
cision or appeal therefrom, or the time of release or escape respectively.
(6) In the event that an appeal was pending when conviction record
information was furnished or disseminated under Sections 2-4 of this Act and
as a result of the appeal, the individual subject was acquitted or the case was
reversed and remanded for further trial which is either pending or was not
prosecuted or ended in an acquittal, these facts shall be promptly supplied to
the agency to which the conviction record information was originally sup-
plied. Nothing herein shall preclude criminal justice agencies or the individ-
ual being detained from notifying the individual's immediate family or his or
her issuer of bail bonds of the individual's detention.
Section 5. Agencies Specifically Designated for Access; Research.
(1) The Attorney General may authorize access to criminal justice
information by:
(a) State agencies when the information is required by the
agency to perform a duty or function expressly required by stat-
ute; and
(b) Other persons or organizations for purposes of programs
of research in state criminal justice agencies.
(2) District attorneys may authorize access to criminal justice record
information by:
(a) Local agencies and municipal corporations when the
information is required to perform a duty or function expressly
required by charter, ordinance, or statute; and
(b) Other persons or organizations for purposes of research
at local levels.
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(3) Whenever a district attorney authorizes access pursuant to subsec-
tion (2) of this section he shall promptly inform the Attorney General of the
authorization to the agency and the character and condition of the authoriza-
tion.
(4) When the Attorney General or a district attorney authorizes access
to criminal justice information pursuant to this section, he shall:
(a) Make a specific finding of the duty and function requir-
ing the access;
(b) Impose such conditions as may be necessary to preserve
the system security and individual privacy; and
(c) Advise the agency, person, or organization of the liabili-
ties attached to unauthorized dissemination of criminal justice in-
formation.
(5) Under this section authorization of access to other than criminal
justice agencies by the Attorney General or a district attorney may be either:
(a) Access to information relating to specific criminal jus-
tice information on a single occasion; or
(b) A general grant of access. General grants may be for
whole categories of criminal justice information for a specified
period of time, not to exceed two years, and shall be required to be
renewed with such specified period. In addition to other specifica-
tions and requirements, the authorization shall provide for the exe-
cution of nondisclosure agreements, audits, and shall specify the
character of the criminal justice information the researchers may
obtain.
(6) When the Attorney General or a district attorney authorizes access
to criminal justice information for research purposes pursuant to this section,
the authorization shall be conditioned upon:
(a) The execution of nondisclosure agreements by all parti-
cipants in the research program; and
(b) The consultation and approval of the criminal justice
agency or agencies maintaining the information system. However,
criminal justice agencies shall not unreasonably withhold approval.
The criminal justice agency may require the requesting party to
reimburse the criminal justice agency for the cost of providing the
authorized information; and
(c) Such additional requirements and conditions including
a statement comparable to -that required by Section 11 of this Act
as he may find necessary to assure the protection of privacy and
security interests.
(7) The Attorney General shall include in a biennial report to the
legislature a report of all authorizations granted by him or by district
attorneys pursuant to this section together with the character and conditions
of the authorizations.
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Section 6. Wanted and Missing Persons.
Wanted persons information and missing persons data may be stored in
an information system, including an automated or computerized system, for
only so long as the person is wanted or missing, and may be disseminated to
law enforcement agencies, news media, and, in the case of missing persons,
to private investigators working on behalf of the next of kin, or to the next of
kin.
Section 7. Representations by Rehabilitation Personnel and Judges.
(1) Parole or probations officers or other persons employed by criminal
justice agencies to assist in the social, occupational, or educational rehabilita-
tion of convicted felons or juvenile offenders may, with the consent of the
person under their supervision to whom it refers, orally represent the
substance of the criminal justice information in any individual data compila-
tion pertaining to said, person to prospective employers, admission and
scholarship officials of educational institutions, lending officials of financial
institutions or private investors if such representation, in the judgment of
such officers, would facilitate the rehabilitation of said person.
(2) A court in a criminal proceeding may disclose selected portions of
criminal justice information pertaining to a party or a sworn witness in such
a case in a published opinion or in the course of a public trial, hearing,
sentencing, arraignment, or appeal.
Section 8. Data to be Purged or Sealed.
(1) Arrest record information shall reflect the disposition of the
arrested person's case whenever a disposition has occurred except when
entries pertaining to a specific arrest are required to be purged by court
order or by operation of this or any other statute.
(2) In the case of any disposition which did not involve an acquittal,
dismissal, or continuance all by reason of either insanity, diminished respon-
sibility, or mental incompetence; a conviction, a nolo contendere plea, an
extradition, a turn-over to federal authorities, a pardon or other exercise of
executive clemency, the data pertaining to the antecedent arrest and to said
disposition shall be purged from the individual data compilation in any
information system. Bail forfeiture of under fifty dollars for traffic viola-
tions shall be treated as failures to prosecute if no further prosecution ensues.
(3) Any criminal justice agency or information system which originally
disseminated data concerning an arrest in its jurisdiction to any criminal
justice agency or other agency with similar function inside or outside the
state or to any information system shall notify the recipient agency or system
of the disposition following such arrest as soon as such information becomes
available. If such disposition requires the purging of the original data then
the originating agency shall notify the recipient agency or system of this fact
and the reason therefor.
(4) Any information system receiving arrest record information to
generate (or be added to) an individual data compilation within its control,
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where such information does not include the disposition, shall query the
originating agency regarding disposition no less often than every ninety days
until such time as the disposition is received and either added to the
compilation or data pertaining to the arrest incident is purged. Pending such
clarification or purge, the information system shall record an entry generally
understood to mean "no disposition as yet."
(5) If no disposition has been achieved within eighteen months of an
arrest and the arrestee is not or has not been a fugitive on that or any other
charge during said eighteen months, the data pertaining to that arrest shall
be purged. If the information system is automated or computerized, purging
under this section shall be done automatically.
(6) Any criminal justice agency desiring to itself continue to maintain
arrest record information otherwise subject to purge or to have an informa-
tion system continue to maintain such information may petition the Governor
or his or her delegate for an exception to the purge requirement of this
section. Upon receipt of such a petition the Governor or his or her delegate
shall notify the subject of the arrest record information of his or her rights to
and in connection with a contested case hearing to determine the propriety
of continued maintenance of such information. The burden in such a proceed-
ing is on the criminal justice agency to show a compelling public interest in
maintaining such information. [An acquittal, dismissal, or decision not to
prosecute the individual following his arrest based solely on lack of admissible
corroborating evidence in conjunction with the constitutional inadmissibility
(on search and seizure or due process grounds) of ostensibly probative and
incriminating evidence, testimony, or confessions, may be evidence of a com-
pelling public interest but need not be determinative of such an interest.] If the
Governor delegates a person to act in his or her stead for the purpose of this
section such a person shall not be or shall not have been active in law
enforcement work and shall not be or shall not have been active in the
criminal defense bar.
(7) Criminal justice information may be purged or sealed by order of a
court having jurisdiction over such a matter or by operation of statute. If an
item of information is to be sealed, it shall be sealed in all information
systems in the state; and the court, if any, ordering the sealing, and the
criminal justice agency that originally recorded the information, shall notify
all information systems believed to contain the information of the fact that it
should be sealed.
(8) In the event that the only data in an individual data compilation is
an arrest record subject to purge under paragraphs (2) or (5) of this section
and there has been no successful petition under paragraph (6) of this
section, the purging shall be accomplished so that no trace remains of the
individual's name or other identity referent.
(9) The provisions of subparagraphs (2), (3), (5), and (8) of this
section shall not apply to "police -blotters" and analogous arrest records
maintained at the lowest adminstrative levels on a collective (non-com-
piled), daily basis.
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Section 9. Maintenance of Audit Trails; Details of Audit Entry.
(1) All information systems shall maintain audit entries covering a
period of time of no less than four years in the immediate past.
(2) To the extent that an information system or its personnel may
transfer, disseminate, share, transmit, or input some or all of an individual
data compilation stored in such system to another information system, it shall
also transmit to the other system all audit entries appropriately identified
with reference to the subject of each such individual data compilation or
portion thereof. The receiving information system shall maintain such audit
entry information in the same general manner as it shall maintain audit
entries originating at such receiving information system.
(3) An audit entry shall be maintained by every information system for
every incident (whether internal or external) of access, input, processing or
manipulation, or output involving an individual data compilation (all or any
of which are hereinafter referred to as "access incidents"). Each such entry
shall be retrievable on the basis of the identity of the subject of the
individual data compilation and shall contain, at the minimum:
(a) A designation of the type of information involved in
such incident (including criminal justice intelligence information);
(b) The identity of the person initiating the incident, and the
identity of his or her supervisor;
(c) The name of the agency by whom the person identified
in (b) is employed;
(d) The date of the incident; and
(e) A designation of whether data was added to, deleted
from, substituted, modified or processed, displayed, output, relo-
cated, or additionally located (and, if relocated or additionally
located, an identifying reference to the new or additional location
must be included).
(4) If personnel operating an information system access the system
internally and subsequently, using a hard copy or information generated by
that access, disseminate the information externally, an audit entry for both
the internal access incident and the external access incident must be
generated and maintained in the information system.
(5) An access incident which is nothing more than a search by the
computer in a computerized information system (or an identity check by
operating personnel in a non-computerized information system) for the
proper information in the course of generating, compiling, retrieving, or
processing data on a different individual shall not require an audit entry.
(6) An access incident which occurs solely in the course of the
generation of a statistical report or other analytical research during which
and from the end result of which the identity of any one individual is not
readily ascertainable or reasonably inferrable shall not require an audit
entry. However, if such report or research is done by an agency or
individual other than a criminal justice agency, under the provisions of
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Section 5(6) of this Act, an audit entry shall be required. 11is audit entry
may consist of a designation referring to the researching entity's identity and
the specific authorization received under Section 5(5) and (6) of this Act.
Section 10. Data Subject's Right to Review.
(1) Any individual shall have the right to inspect wanted persons
information, missing persons data, or criminal justice information and all
available audit entries pertaining thereto in his or her own individual data
compilation in an information system.
(2) Such inspection may take place at:
(a) The criminal justice agency of origin of specific portions
of such information as to those portions; or
(b) A criminal justice agency having physical custody of all
or a portion of such information as to the portion in such custody;
or
(c) At any criminal justice agency (including facilities of the
State Corrections Division) having access to an information system
containing the individual's data compilation.
(3) Agencies at which such information may be inspected may pre-
scribe reasonable hours and places of inspection and may impose such
additional restrictions, including fingerprinting, as are reasonably necessary
to assure the security of the information and to verify the identity of those
who seek the inspection.
(4) The agency shall allow the individual's immediate family and/or
attorney to participate in the inspection if the individual so requests. The
agency shall provide a hard copy of the inspected information if the
individual so requests. The agency shall provide a person experienced in
interpreting the data and the audit entries to make explanations on the
agency's premises when and where necessary for the individuars accurate
understanding of the inspected or copied material. A record shall be
maintained by the agency, and the identities of the inspecting parties and the
interpreting personnel, and a report of the inspection shall immediately be
sent to information systems to which or with which the agency has previously
transmitted or shared data concerning the subject individual. The provisions
of this law pertaining to challenges, requests, and appeals from denials of re-
quests shall be provided by the agency to the individual at the time of the
inspection.
(5) No audit entries or location references pertaining to criminal justice
intelligence material shall be available for inspection or copying under this
section.
(6) No individual may inspect or copy information under this section
from the same information system sooner than 180 days from the time he or
she last exercised such rights to inspect or copy unless he or she obtains a
waiver from the official responsible for operating the information system.
The granting of such a waiver shall be within the discretion of such official.
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(7) If an individual, after inspection or copying of criminal justice
information in an individual data compilation pertaining to himself or
herself, believes such information to be an inaccurate, deceptive, or incom-
plete recital of historical fact, or believes that such information contains data
prohibited by law, he or she may challenge the data and request specified
corrections, deletions, or additions be made subject to the procedures specified
herein.
(8) Such a challenge and request shall be made in writing within forty
days after the date of the beginning of the inspection and shall be presented
to the criminal justice agency or other agency of the State or its political
subdivisions which originated or generated the challenged data. Such
agency shall immediately inform all information systems to which or with
which it has previously transmitted or shared data concerning the subject
individual of the filing of a challenge and the date or dates of the entry or
entries being challanged.
(9) (a) Immediately following a report of an inspection by an in-
dividual under this section, information systems shall add to the
appropriate individual data compilation a review status designation
generally understood to mean "subject review pending";
(b) If no challenge is reported to have been filed within the
forty day period, information systems shall change the review
status to a designation generally understood to mean "subject re-
view completed without challenge";
(c) If a challenge is reported -to have been filed within the
forty day period, information systems shall change the review status
to a designation generally understood to mean "subject challange
pending re: entries of "with the dates of the challenged
entries to be inserted in the blank space;
(d) After the challenge procedure has culminated in a final
determination and after review has been completed or waived, the
information systems receiving reports of such final determination
shall change the review status to a designation generally understood
to reveal the date of the final determination, its docket number, and
the words "challenge denied," "challenge sustained," or "challenge
partially sustained" as the case may be.
(10) Information systems receiving a report of a challenge sustained or
partially sustained shall immediately change the relevant data to comport
with the more accurate version produced in the final determination of the
challenge. If material is to be deleted it shall be removed in such a manner
that no person or machine can know, understand, or process the deleted
material.
(11) If the agency to which the claim is submitted has neither
sustained, partially sustained, or denied the challenge within thirty days
following its submission, the challenge shall be deemed denied by that
agency insofar as the procedure for further review is concerned.
(12) If the agency which originated or initially generated the informa-
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tion is not within this State, the subject of the individual data compilation
may pursue whatever procedures are appropriate under the law of the
jurisdiction where such agency is located. If and when such agency makes a
report of challenge or makes a final determination of the challenge and such
final determination is reported .by or verified by such agency to an informa-
tion system in this State, such information system shall update the review
status of the subject's individual data compilation and the compilation itself
in accord with the requirements of paragraphs (9) and (10) of this section.
The forty-day period for challenge shall not apply to this paragraph, and, if
no report of final determination or no renewal of a "challenge pending"
report is made within 220 days of the beginning of the inspection, the
information system shall change the review status to a designation generally
understood to mean "challenge denied" unless and until a contrary report is
received, at which time the appropriate correction to the review status and
the individual data compilation shall be made.
(13) If the agency to which the challenge is presented declines to carry
out the request of the subject of the individual data compilation to such
subject's satisfaction, he or she may file a written request for review by the
Governor or his or her delegate. If the Governor delegates a person to act
in his or her stead for the purposes of this section, such person shall not be or
shall not have been active in law enforcement work and shall not be or shall
not have been active in the criminal defense bar.
The Governor or his or her delegate shall, in each case in which he or
she finds a colorable basis for the challenge, conduct a contested case
hearing. The underlying merits of the decision or activity which is the
subject of the record shall not -be in issue; only the accuracy, completeness,
deceptiveness, or the includability in criminal justice information of the
description of the decision of activity shall be in issue.
The agency, the Governor or his or her delegate, or the reviewing court,
as the case may be, shall notify the agencies operating the information
systems involved of the determination concerning the challenge and the pen-
dency of further review if and when any further review is initiated. When no
further review is possible, or when further review is waived, the last deter-
mining entity shall notify the information systems involved that the determina-
tion is final. In all such determination or review proceedings, the burden of
justifying the requested change shall be on the subject of the individual data
compilation.
(14) If a change in the criminal justice information concerning a
person is required by reason of a successful challenge, or any internal action
by the originating agency or the operators of an information system, all
criminal justice agencies, including those in other states and in the federal
government to which the now-changed criminal justice information in that
person's individual data compilation was transmitted within four years
preceding the final determination requiring the change, shall be notified by
the information system of the exact nature of the change and to whom it
pertains. The subject of the individual data compilation shall be promptly
provided with a hard copy of the corrected information. Nothing in this
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paragraph shall preclude the subject of an individual data compilation from
personally notifying recipients of the now-changed information who received
such information more than four years before the necessity for the change
was determined to the extent he or she knows the identity of such recipients.
Upon such notification and verification from the appropriate information
system, such recipients shall update their records to comply with the change.
(15) If a change in the criminal justice information concerning a
person is required by reason of a successful challenge or any internal action
by the originating agency or the operators of an information system, all non-
criminal justice agencies or entities to which the now-changed criminal justice
information in that person's individual data compilation was transmitted
within two years preceding the final determination requiring the change
shall be notified by the information system of the exact nature of the
change and to whom it pertains. The information system, its employees and
operators, the State, its political subdivisions, and their respective officials
and employees, shall be immune from civil suit for invasion of privacy as a
consequence of following the procedures or sending the notifications required
by this section.
Section 11. Administration; Security; Training Programs; Audits.
(1) Each information system shall adopt reasonable procedures
designed to protect the physical security of the system and its contents, to
prevent the unauthorized disclosure of all information contained in the
system, to facilitate the current and accurate revision of criminal justice
information to include subsequently received data, and to provide a continu-
ing education program in the proper use and control of criminal justice
information.
(2) The Governor or a criminal justice agency designated by him or
her shall, in the manner provided by the State Administrative Procedure Act,
adopt such rules as may be necessary t6 implement this Act.
(3) Whenever it appears to the Governor that an agency or person has
failed or refused to comply with this Act or with rules adopted pursuant to
paragraph (2) of this section, the Governor may bring suit for injunctive
relief in the name and on behalf of this State in the [circuit] court of any
county of this state to enforce compliance with the Act or such rule. Upon a
proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction shall be granted.
(4) All employees of criminal justice agencies entitled to maintain or
receive criminal justice information and criminal justice intelligence material
from information systems shall, as a condition of their employment, execute
(no less often than every two years) a statement indicating that they are
aware of the security and privacy requirements of this Act and regulations
thereunder and have been instructed in the proper use and control of such
information.
(5) No less often than every two years each information system shall
conduct a random sample audit of the individual data compilations which
were active (i.e. which had an access, input, processing or manipulation, or
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output) involving criminal justice intelligence material within the preceding
two years. Individual data compilations numbering no less than [one-tenth of
one percent] of the total of such active compilations shall be examined in the
course of each such audit. Audit trails in such audited compilations shall be
traced and verified. Inaccuracies in coding, and violations of conditions of or
restrictions on access, dissemination or input, and any other aspects of non-
compliance with this Act shall be noted, corrected to the extent possible
(including the sending of the notifications specified in Section 10(14) and
(15) where appropriate) and brought to the attention of the responsible
officials for such further action or reprimands as may be appropriate. A
summary of the findings of the audit and the actions taken as a result of the
audit shall be transmitted to the Governor within sixty days of the comple-
tion of the audit. The summary shall not mention the subjects of the
individual data compilations by name or other identifier. Each such sum-
mary shall become a public record upon filing with the Governor.
Section 12. Intelligence and Surveillance Data.
(1) No automated or computerized information system shall contain,
store, process, transfer, or disseminate criminal justice intelligence material
or surveillance reports pertaining to any individual person. For purposes of
this section a TWX, a teletypewriter, a MODEM device, an encryption or
scrambling device, or a computerized message switching device belonging to a
licensed common carrier of communications shall not be deemed an informa-
tion system.
(2) No criminal justice agency shall collect or maintain information
about the political, religious, or social views, associations, or activities of any
individual, group, association, organization, corporation, business, or partner-
ship unless such information directly relates to an investigation of past or
threatened criminal conduct and there are reasonable grounds to suspect the
subject of the information is or may be involved in such conduct.
Section 13. Civil Actions; Criminal Sanctions.
(1) Any person may institute an action against this State, its employ-
ees, its criminal justice agencies, or its political subdivisions, their criminal
justice agencies and their employees, for his or her damages for any violation
of this Act, and to restrain future violations. Such action shall be brought in
the [circuit] court of the county in which the individual resides or in which
the allegedly violating criminal justice agency is located; and
(a) If a violation of the Act is proven, the person instituting
the action shall recover his actual damages or $1,000, which-
ever is greater, together with reasonable attorney fees and costs and
disbursements incurred; and
(b) Upon a showing of a wilful violation of the Act, -the per-
son will also be entitled to punitive damages; and
(c) Recovery under this section against this State or its
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political subdivisions shall be subject to the maximum limits speci-
fied in [the sovereign immunity waiver statute].
(2) In any proceedings brought pursuant to this section the chief
administrative officer of the criminal justice agency from which the informa-
tion was published or disseminated will be rebuttably presumed to have
authorized the dissemination contrary to this Act by his agent or employee
and may be jointly and severally liable with the employee or agent.
(3) Information that is merely erroneous in content but is not
maintained or disseminated in violation of this Act shall not cause any
defendant to be liable in an action brought under this section unless the
defendant or its agents wilfully and knowingly caused the content to be
erroneous, or recklessly disregarded its erroneous nature after gaining actual
knowledge that it was in error.
(4) Nothing in this Act shall prejudice, preempt, alter, or preclude
whatever rights a person who is the subject of any individual data compila-
tion may have under common law or statute:
(a) To sue another person or entity for defamation; or
(b) To sue a person who is not connected with, acting for,
or employed by a criminal justice agency and who knowingly ob-
tained, used or disseminated information concerning such individ-
ual that was or is contained in an information system in violation
of this statute or of any other law.
(5) Any person who wilfully requests, obtains, or seeks to obtain
information in any manner except in accordance with this Act, or who
wilfully communicates or seeks to communicate criminal record information
to any agency or person except in accordance with this Act, or any person
who wilfully falsifies criminal justice information, criminal justice intelligence
material, or any records relating thereto, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Section 14. Amendments to Other Statutes.
[It may be necessary in any given jurisdiction to amend, concurrently
with the enactment of this statute, other statutes already in force. For
example, statutes conferring record keeping authority on state and local
police may require modification. Similarly, public records statutes and
freedom of information laws may require alignment with this statute. The
civil sanctions sections may require alteration of the waiver of governmental
immunity laws.]
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